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Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
The Muslim Brotherhood has been an active element of Egyptian political life
since its founding in 1928 by school teacher Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim
Brotherhood, also known as al-lkhwan al-Muslimun, has helped shape Egypt’s
political scene for decades. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is popular with the
masses and contributes to its strength as a grassroots movement. It is also the largest
and most influential Islamist group in the Arab region due to its years of political and
charitable participation which started in the Egyptian society and then branched to the
Arab region. The Muslim Brotherhood’s philosophical foundations reflect the
thinking of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, whose firm devotion to the Qur'an and the
Sunnah resulted in his finding of the society of Muslim Brothers with the initial goal
of mass education on matters such as the Sunna and Quran. Hassan al-Banna
observed immorality during the colonial era as a result of the actions of the British
soldiers in Ismailya such as prostitution and alcohol which affected the view of alBanna and led his call for the end of colonialism. Al-Banna commented saying, “I
believe that my people, because of the political stages which they have passed
through them, and under the impact of western civilization… materialist philosophy
and franji traditions, have departed from the goals of their faith” (Mitchell, 6). These
observations of society under British rule resulted in his decision to create a group
dedicated to leading people back to their faith through counseling. This group was
created as a reaction to the developments al-Banna observed in society, which makes
it a reactionary movement.
Its initial involvement in contemporary politics was observed in the interwar
period where they organized demonstrations against colonial rule in Egypt. Another

Al Khalifa 3
issue the Brotherhood was deeply involved in during the interwar period was the issue
of Palestine. The Brotherhood organized efforts to raise funds to support the Arab
Strike in Palestine (Mitchell, 17). The Muslim Brotherhood’s participation was also
observed in the 1952 Revolution, where they participated with President Gamal Abdel
Nasser to over throw the monarchy. The Brotherhood supported Nasser through
mobilizing protests in support of Nasser and the coup. The Brotherhood also tried to
participate in the state in the post-coup Egypt, but was ultimately sidelined by the
regime. After an attempt to assassinate Nasser, which would later be blamed at the
Brotherhood, the populist president banned the group, imprisoning and persecuting
and tortured many of its members such as Sayid Qutb. The group became banned
under Nasser and continued to be banned during the era of his successor President
Anwar Sadat, at first he continued the brutal policies of his successor, although he
gradually eased the restrictions placed on the group by freeing some from prison and
by allowing the group to resume its activities despite still being illegal. One of the
members which were jailed, Sayid Qutb and would write a book transforming the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood; his book called for jihad against rulers because
of their corruption. This group, which supported violence, would splinter away from
the Muslim Brotherhood and influence jihadists for generations to come. After Sadat
signed the Camp David Accords, the Muslim Brothers would soon find themselves
involved in paramilitary activities in which a group would successfully assassinate
him. These politically oriented paramilitary activities lead President Hosni Mubarak
to revert to the tactics of Nasser to help be rid of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak,
using legal tools, such as the state of emergency kept a tight rein on the political and
charitable activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The mass popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood would threaten the regimes of
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Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak and eventually lead to the Brotherhood maintaining its
illegal status, its members being persecuted and forcing them into the underground. In
its operations as an underground movement, the Brotherhood was able to build a solid
network of charitable institutions that dually functioned as a political apparatus. Its
popularity, due to its continuous participation in social charity, created wide appeal in
the impoverished class who were ignored by the government, solidifying its status as
the most organized grassroots movements. Its continuous participation in the social
sphere and running in elections as independent candidates made impossible for
authoritarian regimes to completely eradicate despite their best efforts (Filiu, 98).
The Muslim Brotherhood was more than just a socio-political movement, it
was “a political organization, an athletic group, acultural-educational union, an
economic company, and a socialidea” (Mitchell, 14). The lack of, what is in their
view as the proper application Islam in state, has caused them to continuously try to
rebel against the state. As a result of years of authoritarianism, mass demonstrations
from all segments in society succeeded in toppling the Mubarak regime in 18 days.
Despite their initial reservations to participating in the mass demonstrations, the
Muslim Brotherhood significantly to the success of the January 25 Revolution and to
subsequent state building initiatives.While no one movement can claim to be the
cause behind the 2011 Revolution, several movements, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, compiled their efforts, and put aside their ideological differences in
order to get rid of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. The initial 18 days of the Egyptian
Revolution brought together young liberal protesters and the Muslim Brotherhood,
and this unlikely alliance was believed by many at the time to be the result of the Arab
Spring, having inspired likeminded demonstrators in neighbouring countries such as
Syria and Libya to stage their own protests (New York Times, 6). Due to the Muslim
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Brotherhood being the “largest and most sustained opposition movement” (Brown,
207),with an unmatched ability to organize its followers to support a given agenda,
were in the position to take advantage of the power vacuum take hold of power, the
final aspiration for a revolutionary organization (Sharp, 20).
This study will look into how the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood since
its establishment has affected its recent political activities. In particular, the thesis will
analyze the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak’s regime so as to
explain its eventual political success in the post Mubarak Egypt as well as its eventual
failures in institution building in the post January 2011 Egypt. It is my contention that
the Muslim Brotherhood’s state building initiatives are employing the same
authoritarian tools used by Mubarak. This work will attempt to add to the existing
literature about the Muslim Brotherhood by exploring how despite the experiences
gained by the group in organizing social services for masses and by their experience
as opposition which ultimately caused their rise to power are also caused their
mistakes in state building and their eventual ouster.
This thesis adopts a comparative approach, as well as examining the
retrospective and prospective political aspirations of the group. The comparative
approach will be used in order to compare the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood
from before the January 2011 Revolution with their actions after the January 2011
Revolution in order to establish common characteristics in their approach to state and
society. The research method will involve a critical assessment of their decisions to
understand their application of their ideology in a modern state. First, a literature
review will be presented to provide a view of the different scholarly works and their
opinions about the Muslim Brotherhood and the different analysis of the players,
principles, and political circumstances, during the period preceding the January 25
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Revolution and which eventually led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the
Freedom and Justice Party, to rise to power. This will then be followed by a
presentation of the Egyptian case study and the Muslim Brotherhood experience
through the use of specific events during the 25th of January Revolution and the
transitional phase, which will help demonstrate the hypotheses that the Muslim
Brotherhood had a significant role, that it subsequently used Mubarak’s method to
hold on to power, and that the internal characteristics which untimely caused their rise
to power also caused their mistakes in state building and the rise of opposition.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement falls under the umbrella of the political
Islam theory and whose movements which have been given a chance at state rule as a
result of the Arab Spring. The events of the Arab Spring have affected the Muslim
Brotherhood movement by giving them the opportunity to actually implement their
ideology at a state level. It is important to clarify that the events in Egypt did not
happen in a vacuum. The Muslim Brotherhood, while a movement that started in
Egypt, it has expanded beyond the Egyptian state. This study will also look into the
methods of political participation which the Muslim Brotherhood practiced under the
different regimes in Egypt.
During the 18 day Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood endeavoured
to avoid the limelight but observers noted that it was “seizing the political
momentum” (Trager, 114). Since their rise to power, the Muslim Brotherhood has
used their political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, in order to promote their
political goals. It has publically accepted that democracy is the form of government
they which to implement and denounced violence, which serves as an indication to
the ideological evolution of the group. One of its expressed goals is the creation of a
nation governed by Islamic law, or Sharia (Ramadan) but this has been a point of
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criticism due to the various interpretations of Islamic law and the complications. Yet
despite the evolution of the group, they ultimately commit the same mistakes of the
Mubarak regime and result in their own demise in the June 30th Uprising.

1.1 Research Question
This research seeks to answer to explore the question of the role of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution. Through this question this study will explore
how the Muslim Brotherhood came about this role through exploring the internal and
external characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood. This question will be answered
by exploring the roots of the Muslim Brotherhood, how it became involved in
Egyptian politics as well as to identify the sources of its political strength by
exploring their role, this paper will assess how the Muslim Brotherhood acted in the
crucial days of the revolution to validate its principles, assess its path and eventually
start their rise to power. With the Muslim Brotherhood being the largest, most
organized opposition group in Egypt, it has the necessary numbers to influence events
through the power to mobilize, which was observed in the initial 18 days of the
revolution.
In order to better understand the Egyptian revolution, looking into the internal
dynamics and the different ideologies represented in the different players participating
is essential. It is important to emphasize that the Muslim Brotherhood has had a great
role in Egypt from before the 2011 Revolution as it helped shape many of Nasser,
Sadat, and Mubarak’s policies as well as becoming a tool for these authoritarian rulers
to convince citizens of the validity of these authoritarian policies. An indicator of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity which they used in mobilization is their rising
numbers, by the late 1940s “had over two thousand branches throughout Egypt

Al Khalifa 8
and between 300,000 and 600,000 active members-the largest organized force in the
country” (Munson) and continues to increase as the organization expands to a global
organization. Sometime after its disbandment in 1948, the group had allegedly
masterminded the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi. Al-Banna
who was implicated in the assassination by virtue of being the founder of the
Brotherhood, condemned the killing, and was in turn assassinated by an unknown
gunman; allegedly a member of the government’s security forces (Mitchell, 68). The
assassination of al-Nuqrashi caused backlash amongst the supporters of al-Nuqrashi
who protested demanding the “death of Hassan al-Banna” (Mitchell, 67). This trend
of using the Muslim Brotherhood in order to create an image of an enemy is a trend
that is used by authoritarian rulers. Through exploring these tactics this paper seeks
to expand on a study in political science which is the actions of authoritarian rules in
order to maintain power. After the assassination of al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood
was able to work with Nasser in 1948 through mobilizing people to support the coup
d'état. It was because the Muslim Brotherhood was tied to an unsuccessful attempt to
assassinate President Gamal Abdul Nasser that caused Nasser to turn against the
group which had initially requested to help in the initial state building stages of the
1952 Revolution (Bajoria para 2). Muslim Brotherhood members were imprisoned by
Nasser which demonstrates how authoritarian rulers can use the opposition for their
own advantage. Later on, a splinter group was implicated in the assassination of
President Anwar al-Sadat, making legal recognition for the group impossible. Since
then, the paradox of the Muslim Brotherhood is that despite its status officially as an
illegal entity in Egypt, it has continued to exert influence socially, economically,
religiously, and politically. This kind of influence which has been gained through
experiences over decades is what this paper seeks to explore and relate to its role in
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the 2011 Revolution and its plan for state building. This study will also explore the
different tactics that were practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party in political participation and how they are similar to the tactics that were
practiced by the National Democratic Party. This tactics such as intimidation of
opposition and lack of transparency have led to the culmination of mass grievances by
the Egyptian people, which will tested their popularity as they were being held
accountable for their promises as the ruling party, as they failed to meet these
promises they were revolted against in the 30th of June Uprising.

1.2 Hypothesis
This paper will seek to demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood has been
influential in the 2011 Revolution. This paper will display that the internal
characteristics in the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood how these have affected
their participation in the 2011 Revolution. This paper will also link how the image
gained through their popular charitable services have made the Muslim Brotherhood’s
transition into politics easier as they have gained mass popularity amongst the
Egyptians. Bearing in mind how they built their image as an opposition force under
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, has helped shape their image as an organized opposition
force fighting authoritarianism, resulting in an increase in their ability to recruit
members who opposed the idea of authoritarianism. Since Muslim Brotherhood has
also gained creditability through its participation in civil society, its popularity
amongst the lower and middle class Egyptians would lead to them being able to play
an influential role in the 2011 Revolution. This study will seek to link that criticisms
of the opposition to the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to display how
their more organized grassroots connections as opposed to the more liberal
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movements who lacked the same connections enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to
have political successes.
This paper will also seek to argue that an elected movement with mass
popularity does not necessarily equate with the transition to a democracy with a
popular government. Through the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party, it becomes evident that despite the Muslim Brotherhood coming into
power through democratic means they are using the same legal and illegal tactics of
the National Democratic Party in order to intimidate and stifle their opposition.

1.3 Conceptual Framework
In order to fully portray the multi-dimensional nature of this topic and the
transition in organizations built upon religious ideologies to the practicing of politics
as a legal party; this thesis will adopt several theories in the process of arguing the
role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution as well as their evolution
which brought them into the political scene in Egypt. This study will explain the
different theories of political Islam as well as the ideological theories which have
helped develop the Muslim Brotherhood such as the ideologies of Hassan al-Banna,
Sayid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi. These theories help show on an individual level
of analysis, how the individual can have an effect on the development of the Muslim
Brotherhood. These individual works will help portray the justifications that have
been given to explain the transition from a group that is based on mass education to a
group which participates in elections.
In order to understand the evolution that has occurred since the creation of the
Muslim Brotherhood to its role as the ruling party this thesis will take into account the
different regimes under which the Muslim Brotherhood developed and the form of

Al Khalifa 11
governments in Egypt which were all authoritarian regimes and the different tools
such as legal tools which these regimes take in order to explain how the Muslim
Brotherhood was affected.This method will provide a comprehensive view of how the
Muslim Brotherhood became a political force which has gained such electoral
successes in the post Arab Spring Egypt despite them being an illegal group since
their creation. This study will also discuss the tools that the Muslim Brotherhood used
in order to gain recruits and mass mobilize people such as the rally effect, as well as
social mobilization theory. One of the most widely accepted accounts is based directly
on Emile Durkheim's analysis of social change in which she explains how groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood are symbolic of traditional beliefs where
authoritarian regimes were “westernizing” Egypt. This study will also link concepts
such as Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution, which studies the patterns of a
revolution; such will be equated to the Brotherhood and the Egyptian experience to
come up with a theoretical evaluation of events.
1.4 Methodology
The comparative methodology used in this thesis in the approach to a
conclusion best displays the changes in the Muslim Brotherhood and their effect. This
is primarily achieved through the study of works written by academics who have
written about the subject matter. This study will analyze these works and through
reading multiple credible academic sources such as books and articles written by
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This will result in a more elaborate view of the
nature of the Muslim Brotherhood and its transition into politics as a legal party as
opposed to an underground, illegal organization. In order to better understand this
transition, this study will look for patterns in the political and social activities of the
Muslim Brotherhood under the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. This study,
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which while focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood, employs both deductive and
inductive reasoning by looking the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in society
in order to determine how these actions could possibly increase the popularity of the
Muslim Brotherhood and eventually resulting in the political successes gained by its
Freedom and Justice Party.
It is also important to look at existing patterns in the participation of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring. In order to understand its role in the
Egyptian Revolution, there is a need to explore the structure of the Muslim
Brotherhood in order to properly understand how it functions. This will be obtained
by detailed research into the Muslim Brotherhood’s structure and how this can
possible affect its performance in politics and its popularity in society. In addition to
this, there will be an investigation into the role the Muslim Brotherhood in society
through its charity functions. In order to achieve this information, this thesis will
include references to lectures given by prominent members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party as well as accounts of citizens who have
benefited from the charity functions of the Muslim Brotherhood. In order to
understand the political scene of Egypt in the post Arab Spring revolutions, this thesis
will include mentions of talks given by activists from the opposition in order to
understand their assessment of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the post
January 2011 Revolution as well as the failures which led to the demise of the group.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Creation of the Muslim Brotherhood
There are many aspects in approaching the topic of the development of the
Muslim Brotherhood and how this development enabled their participation in the
2011 Revolution. The creation and the ideology behind the Muslim Brotherhood is
important when studying the organization’s development. The Muslim Brotherhood is
a complex organization that works in a multifaceted environment encompassing the
social, economic, political, ideological and religious aspects of the Egypt. The history
of the Muslim Brotherhood is directly correlated with the transformations that
Egyptian society underwent. Many authors have written about the creation of the
Muslim Brotherhood and its development since. In studying the history of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the reasoning behind its ideology becomes evident which is essential in
analyzing the development of the ideology and its application in the post January 25
Revolution.
The creation of the Muslim of the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen in the
participation of its creator Hassan al-Banna prior to him creating the Muslim
Brotherhood in organizations with similar emphasis on religion. Author Richard
Mitchell discusses in his book the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in his book
The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood. The title of the book is indicative to the
difference in opinion regarding how to label the Muslim Brotherhood. His labeling
the group as a “society” shows how close the group is to each other, as it thrives on
the family like units it creates through recruiting members and ensuring they interact
with each other. Mitchell goes into depth about the history of Hassan al-Banna and
how he was involved in several groups which called for fighting immorality on the
streets. These groups which al-Banna joined preached to people the importance of
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staying close towards what was deemed proper by Islam and tried to prevent people
from being immoral. Mitchell explains how these groups would have influenced the
al-Banna and the way he structured his group, the Muslim Brotherhood and its
ideology. One important factor which Mitchell discusses is how Cairo affected his
point of view and the lack of religiousness which he observed there. One crucial point
in the development of al-Banna which affects his creation of the Muslim Brotherhood
is al-Banna’s time in Ismailya. One important aspect that Mitchell does not discuss is
the significance of Ismailya to al-Banna’s ideology. In Ismailya, which is in the Suez
Canal was a base for British soliders, al-Banna saw how women became prostitutes
for these soldiers and saw their drinking which only gave him more incentive to
create the Muslim Brotherhood.
Author William Cleveland in his book, A History of the Modern Middle East
elaborates on the rise as well as the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He
explains that the Muslim Brotherhood begins in the late 1920s at the hands of Hassan
al-Banna “a layman educated at the teachers training collage” (Cleveland, 199). This
work by Cleveland goes into depth about the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood.
One interesting point that he focuses on is the reasoning behind the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood is a result of socio-economic reasons, which propelled al-Banna to create
the Muslim Brotherhood. This reasoning, does not mention how colonialism plays a
direct role in the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and how colonialism had
directly affected al-Banna and caused him to create this group. In Cleveland’s book,
the author takes a more historical approach and does not explain how the Muslim
Brotherhood transcends past the Egyptian borders to spread across the whole Middle
East and eventually becoming a global movement.
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The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood can be credited to several reasons.
These reasons can be observed internally and externally. The internal reasons,
represented in the domestic issues in Egypt which lead to the creation of the Muslim
Brotherhood are discussed by author Arthur Goldschmidt in his book A Concise
History of the Middle East, he elaborates that people wanted social reform and the
capitalists who dominated parliament did not see social reform as an objective which
benefited their own goals. There existed many ideologies abroad such as Socialism
and Marxism which had some appeal to the educated elite in Egypt, but none had the
appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood which promised to fulfill the promises that
parliament ignored. He also explains that the conservative nature of the Middle East
played a role in the rejection of secular ideas such as Marxism and the popularity and
appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood who also advocated this conservatism.
In James Glevin’s book, The Middle East: A History, he takes a very
interesting approach in explaining the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s.
He discusses how successful the ideology was in light of the failures of the Middle
Eastern governments. This would help explain the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood
since its ideology preaches to the creation of social justice. One aspect he could have
elaborated on in the book would be how Egypt has gone through several ideologies
that have failed. In this book he explains that the reason behind the widespread mass
popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood is the failure of the Middle Eastern
governments to fulfill the economic promises and as such the Muslim Brotherhood
was able to take advantage of that lack of trust and anger in gaining supporters. One
important aspect that Gelvin points out is that the defeat of the Middle Eastern armies
and the loss of Palestine. This point helps explain how people blamed the
governments and as such were looking for other options and the Muslim Brotherhood
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represented a different ideology that could possibly fulfill these promises that were
made by the governments. This sentiment is still present currently in the Middle East
as the people were still looking for the group to fulfill the promises, and with the Arab
Spring specifically in Egypt the people chose a different ideology which is political
Islam.
Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood
The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood stems from the examples which
were set by the Prophet Mohamed and his followers, including the institutions.
Mitchell explains the bases of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology by explaining their
goals in society. In his book, Mitchell explains the development of the ideology of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and its different stages. He explains that the foundation of the
ideology of the Muslim Brothers encompasses that “Islam [is] a total system… [and]
is applicable to all times and all places” (Mitchell, 14). The author clearly explains the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and how Hassan al-Banna personally
contributed to this thought, and internalized it, and further developed it through
applying it to the creation and the ideology of his new organization which he went on
to preach in order to gain new members. The evolution of the group’s ideology
becomes evident as the organization shifted from one that preached reform through
education to one which called for reform through demonstrations. Mitchell uses a
historical approach to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ideologies in the Muslim
Brotherhood are represented through slogans such as “the Qur’an is our constitution”.
An important factor to look at within these slogans is how adaptable they are to the
modern notion of a state. Goldschmidt elaborates on the significance of the slogan
and how the Muslim Brotherhood used it to their advantage. During the fight for
independence the Muslim Brotherhood phrased slogans that held wider appeal to
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Egyptians in order to gain more supporters and call for the necessary Islamic reforms
they saw as needed in the Egyptian society. After the creation of the Muslim
Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna they began to recruit members from the Suez Canal
city of Ismaliya where they capitalized on Egyptians’ observation that Egypt is
becoming Westernized in order to gain more members.
The reactionary aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood is a point which is
elaborated in Goldschmidt’s book in which he explains that their ideology stemmed
from what they saw as an increasing westernization in Egyptian society seen through
“motion pictures, bars, modern female fashions” (Goldschmidt, 250). In this point
Goldschmidt explains how the movement is a reactionary one to the developments
that were observed in the Middle East and these westernization efforts caused people
to want to hold on to their culture and heritage more. Goldschmidt also explains that
the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood was popular to because it appealed to the
average Egyptian as it preached equality.
At a time when there was little social justice and poverty and illiteracy was
very common an ideology which promised social change is seen as very important.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is also seen as deeply intertwined with the
movement for independence and as such it became widely popular with Egyptians
who were fighting for independence from the British. According to Goldschmidt the
ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is to “restore the customs and institutions of
Islam established by Muhammed and his followers” (Goldschmidt, 250). This point is
contested by author Gelvin who remarks that the Muslim Brotherhood had “made its
peace with the modern nation-state system” (Gelvin. 188). This dilemma still exists in
the modern day institution of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the reconciliation of
the old ideologies with the more modern notions of a state.
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An important aspect of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood can be
observed in the different changes that occur under the different Supreme Guides.
Mitchell elaborates about the shift in ideology that accompanied the time of alHudaybi and how he represented a change in the ideology from the established status
quo which is rebelling against the regime. For example, Supreme Guide Hassan al
Hudaybi, unlike previous Supreme Guide Hassan al-Banna who saw that party
politics were detrimental to the state, participated in the negotiations with the
government and helped instigate reforms that would help gain a better social justice
such the land reforms (Mitchell, 107). Author Barbra H. E. Zollner helped elaborate
on the role of al-Hudaybi and the change that occurred in the Muslim Brotherhood
with the change in leadership. This sheds light on how the individual can help bring
about change in the group and eventually lead to a change in the ideology. Zollener’s
book, The Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology, there are specific
references to the changes in ideology which have occurred under al-Hudaybi and how
he approached his new role as the Supreme Guide through seeing it as a symbolic one
and reformed the ideology and practices such as by eliminating the Secret Unit which
is the military branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even threatening to resign if his
demand was not met.
The Muslim Brotherhood continues to adopt and evolve with the changes that
occur in the political scene. One important aspect that is briefly mentioned in these
works of literature is the transitions that caused for splinter movements within the
group. This change is important because it can be observed currently in the Muslim
Brotherhood. After members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, he imprisoned many members causing many to flee to
Gulf countries. This radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood can be credited to the
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regime not fulfilling its promises to implement Sharia to the members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, at first Nasser did not fulfill the goals of turning the Egyptian society
into a more Islamic one and as such they tried to assassinate him. These paramilitary
activities of the Muslim Brotherhood can also be observed when Sadat signed the
peace treaty with Israel in which he was declared an infidel and therefore his death
would be justified. These transitions are mentioned briefly in the works of Gelvin,
Mitchell and Goldschmidt. This analysis of the splits which occur within the
movement based on ideology can be analyzed and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood
today as internal splits occur due to issues such as the generational gap as well as the
approach to take through the Freedom and Justice Party regarding state building in
Egypt.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics
The Muslim Brotherhood according to scholar Barry Rubin is “by far the most
successful Islamist group in the world” (Rubin, 1). This analysis of the Muslim
Brotherhood can be observed in the writings of several scholars which have analyzed
the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and how the movement has
managed to survive several attempts by authoritarian to end the movement. On the
other end of the spectrum, many scholars have made opposing statements regarding
their performance in the post January 25 Revolution, but they do not negate the
strength of the movement and their ability to mobilize. Several scholars have
addressed the political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood since their creation.
While Rubin makes this assessment it is important to point out the flaws within the
movement itself. In his book, The Muslim Brotherhood the Organization and Policies
of a Global Islamist Movement Rubin makes detailed references regarding the
strength of the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement including how they managed to
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survive the regimes determined to end them. The Muslim Brotherhood was initially
launched into society in the late 1920s as a method to educate members about
“gaining the correct understandings of Islam” (Franganillo, 40). The organization
according to authors Soange and Franganillo became very politicized with the youth
taking to the streets to organize mass demonstrations for the application of Sharia.
These authors approach the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in politics in Egypt
from its creation to show how the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood were affected
by domestic and international factors. The domestic factors include the regimes and
the colonialism, and the international factors include the experiences of Italy and
Germany. The authors then progress to discuss the development of the Muslim
Brotherhood under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak to explain how the Brotherhood
managed to survive the authoritarian tactics to end the Muslim Brotherhood. The
actions undertaken by the Muslim Brotherhood during these regimes have showed
their strength in organizational abilities. These organizational abilities and
experiences can be seen in the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood 2011 Revolution
such as mobilization as well as the subsequent nation building. Literature regarding
the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s transition into a legal party point out
interesting points about their application of their ideology into modern state building,
as well as the tactics that are were undertaken to consolidate power. This thesis
analyzes the performance of the Freedom and Justice party, but through these actions,
it becomes obvious that the Freedom and Justice Party are undertaking the same
tactics as the National Democratic Party which shows that a popular movement that
was brought to power through democratic elections does not necessarily mean
popular, democratic policies.
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Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser
The Muslim Brotherhood were very active under Nasser, as authors
Franganillo and Soage observe they collaborated with Nasser to overthrow the
monarchy. One important point that these authors make is that the Nasser era brought
about one of the most influential thinkers in all of the Muslim Brotherhood’s history,
Sayid Qutb. One important point that should have been made clear about Sayid Qutb
is the development of his ideology and how this has come to affect the overall
transition of the Muslim Brotherhood into politics. Sayid Qutb’s ideology was not
conceptualized by just his time in prison, but also by the time he spent abroad and
observing Western culture which he saw as immoral. What is also important
regarding the Qutb ideology is how it has resonated on future generations of the
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, through creating splinter ideological
movements. This work does not discuss the relationship between Nasser and the
Muslim Brotherhood prior to his crackdown, in which they entered a phase of reform
and negotiations. This phase between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasser regime
is fully elaborated on by author Richard Mitchell, in which he explains that the
Muslim Brotherhood turned against Nasser after he did not implement Sharia, causing
the Muslim Brotherhood to organize demonstrations and eventually try to assassinate
him.
The Muslim Brotherhood under Sadat
The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of President Anwar Sadat is very
important to the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. Under the era of Sadat, authors
Nathan Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin in the book Politics and Society in the
Contemporary Middle East comment saying that Sadat had eased restrictions but it
was only to serve the purpose of the regime of countering the left ideology. This is
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important to the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the literature does not
point out the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood in these times and how by then the
organization had spread past the borders of Egypt to become a global one. One
important aspect in this chapter is that it signifies the beginning of the transition of the
Muslim Brotherhood into electoral politics. Where, as Brown and El-Din point out the
Muslim Brotherhood began running as independents for parliamentary elections. The
splinter group which followed Qutb’s ideology is not mentioned in this chapter but is
mentioned by Soange and Franganillo who explain how the group successfully
assassinates Sadat. The literature in this era of the Muslim Brotherhood tends to
focus on the extremists that assassinated Sadat, but this reflects only a portion of the
Muslim Brotherhood, during the time of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood were great
participants in civil society. In this era of the Muslim Brotherhood it can be argued as
one of the most important eras of the group because it ultimately shaped their image
in the Mubarak years as an extremist group that needs to be jailed. The actions taken
by extremists still play an important role in the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood
into the 2011 Revolution where the regime shaped itself as the protector against such
groups.
Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak
The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Mubarak experienced much of the
same treatment as under Nasser. The Muslim Brotherhood’s activities during the
Mubarak era is seen as very important as they gain many grassroots support which
would have affected their electoral success during the post Arab Spring Egyptian
elections. The literature explains in detail how the Muslim Brotherhood was
suppressed through the use of legal tactics in order to prevent them from maintaining
activities. These tactics, as authors Brown and El-Din explain include the emergency
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law which was used to arrest the Muslim Brotherhood and due to the legalities of the
emergency law, no warrant is needed. Another legal tactic which was used to limit the
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics as authors Soange and Franganillo
explain the civil society law was reformed in order to curb the Muslim Brotherhood’s
participation. Yet despite all these attempts, the Muslim Brotherhood were able to
mobilize and participate in union elections in which they were able to gain massive
successes. One of the most agreed upon regarding the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood is the effect of the 1992 earthquake. Their ability to mobilize and help
those who were left homeless efficiently unlike the regime, helped portray them as
capable of handling crisis situations. The true popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood
can be seen in the legislative elections of 2005 in which they were able to win a
significant amount of the seats, despite all the legal barriers to their participation in
politics, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to field candidates as independents. The
2010 elections had even less even less opposition represented and was considered one
of the fueling points for the 2011 Revolution.
The Muslim Brotherhood under the rule of Mubarak are represented as the
most well organized opposition groups and were the cause of many legal changes in
order for the regime to further consolidate its power. One event which could be linked
to the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood is the Luxor Massacre of 1997, which
is not mentioned in the literature. The regime would group together Islamists in order
to cause people to fear them from them and try to reject them from participation. By
then the ideological problems had caused several splits in the Muslim Brotherhood
such as the generational gap. The newer generations of the Muslim Brotherhood, were
made up as Soange and Franganillo describe as “modern men, with modern views”
(Franganillo, 49). This is very similar to the events regarding the activities of the
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Muslim Brotherhood today. Despite their organization, these ideological problems
stemmed from the generation gap have affected the way their Freedom and Justice
Party, because those in power are not from that generation of the modern men, but of
those with radical ideologies, this connection is missing from the literature, but will
be further explained and analyzed further in the study.
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution
The Muslim Brotherhood in the post Arab Spring were able to solidify their
presence in politics as they made the transition from simply a group to a legal party,
the Freedom and Justice Party. The literature regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s
participation in the revolution all agree that they had no initial participation, but later
when the movement looked like they could ultimately lead to success in the book, The
Arab Spring Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions, scholars Clement Henry, Jang JiHyang and Robert P. Parks make the assessment that the Muslim Brotherhood were
not “at the forefront” (Henry, 18). This is one of the greatest criticisms of the Muslim
Brotherhood during the revolution, yet despite that they were able to gain huge
electoral successes. Author Nathan Brown analyzes the performance of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the post Arab Spring Egypt explaining that the Muslim Brotherhood’s
slogan to political participation is “participation not domination” yet despite that, it is
seen as dominating the political scene by running for seats in every council and union.
These actions are not criticized by Nathan Brown, which would be observed through
seeing the dilemmas which resulted since the Freedom and Justice Party assumed the
highest office, the presidential office indicating that a popular president does not
necessarily mean a democratic one. One important point that scholars Clement Henry,
Jang Ji-Hyang and Robert P. Parks are able to make as a post-Arab Spring literature is
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that the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, the Freedom and Justice Party will face
ideological problems.
The work by Carrie Wickham titled, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of
an Islamist Movement” details the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood with specific
focus to the group’s development in Egypt. One of the most intriguing chapters
discusses the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood from a charity group to a political
group as an extension of the group’s da’wa mission because it highlights the notion of
politics as a from below process. The Muslim Brotherhood upon recognizing that in
order to change the system they must involve themselves in politics in order to be able
to carry out their mission. Wickham’s work displays the tactics used by the Muslim
Brotherhood which have made them even stronger as a political group, which shows
existing trends and tactics undertaken by the group since their creation.
This study will seek to use the literature in order to make links between the pre
2011 Muslim Brotherhood and post the Revolution. These conflicting ideologies
caused because of the differences in time era and the generational gaps are creating
many internal problems for the group itself and subsequently affecting its
performance in the state building efforts.
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Chapter 3: The Muslim Brotherhood before 2011 Revolution
3.1 Hassan al-Banna and the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood
Hassan al Banna was born in a conservative family with four other siblings.
He was raised to value religion in his daily life and was enrolled in a religious school.
This school marked the beginning of al Banna’s path to formulate his religious
ideology to transform society. He was born in October of 1906 in the town of
Mahmudiyya, a town near the city of Alexandria. From an early age Hassan al-Banna
participated in several religious organizations who tried to reform society by calling
for people to closely follow the teachings of Islam. These organizations helped shape
his world views as well as giving him the experience to eventually create his own
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.
At the age of 12 in 1918 he joined the Society for Moral Behaviour and
eventually climbed the ranks of the society to be its leader. He criticized this
organization though by claiming that it was not doing enough to call for people to
implement the religious teaching in their daily lives, and as a result joined the Society
for the Prevention of the Forbidden which as scholar Richard Mitchell describes it
went “deeper” into the roots of society (Mitchell, 2). This society differed from others
because it took a more threatening tone towards people through sending threatening
letters to anyone they deemed was committing a sin. Another organization that alBanna joined was the Hasafiyya Society for Charity (Mitchell, 2). This organization
had a different message than the previous organizations that al-Banna joined because
unlike the others it targeted the actions of Christian monasteries who they saw as
threatening Islam in society. This group was particularly influential for al-Banna’s life
because it was where he started getting involved in Sufism. A-Banna would come to
read various material about Sufism eventually joining a dhikr circle and “becoming a
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disciple of its leading shaykh (Mitchell, 2).
By the end of al-Banna’s primary education he participated along with many
of the members of society in the 1919 Revolution and the student movements which
called for the end of British colonialism in Egypt. This represented how politically
involved al-Banna was and his aims at freeing Egypt from the British who had
corrupted Egypt economically as well as morally. He, like many others was affected
by colonialism in a direct way, “remembered with special bitterness the sight of
British forces in occupation of his home town at the time” (Mitchell, 3).
Hassan al-Banna eventually joined the Teachers Training School, but
eventually left it for the Dar al-’Ulm. In his time during Dar al-’Ulm al-Banna’s
ideology began taking shape, he was influenced by several figures during his
education and expanded on his knowledge of Islam and its teachings. He would read
various materials about the teachings of Islam and how to best apply it to a society.
He would also read historical books about resistance, heroics, and defending religion,
a philosophy that would eventually shape his own group the Society of Muslim
Brothers, more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna then moved
to Cairo in 1923 and was shocked by the state of moral debauchery that existed in the
capital and how separated people were becoming from Islam. Al-Banna observed
situations in the capital that were not in his village such as women’s fashion and
cinemas as well as literary salons. He also observed many political problems such as
party pluralism, which according to al-Banna caused disunity in the state. He places
the blame for this lack of unity on the hands of the Wafd and the Liberal
Constitutionalists who’s irresponsibility caused this disunity in society. He was deeply
angered by the situation in Egypt and began to look for ways to improve the situation:
“No one but God knows how many nights we [Banna and comrades] spent
reviewing the state of the nation… analysing the sickness, and thinking of the
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possible remedies. So disturbed were we that we reached the point of tears”
(Paison 2-3).
Al-Banna, in response to the situation in Cairo, joined another religious group,
the Islamic Society for Nobility and Character. This group was different than others
which al-Banna has previously joined; their approach was more based on preaching to
people at mosques about the proper conduct of Islam and its application in daily life.
Al-Banna felt that this group was not doing enough and took it upon himself and other
fellow members from the Dar al-‘Ulm to venture in other venues such as “coffee
houses and other popular meeting places” (Mitchell, 5).
By the end of al-Banna’s time in the Dar al-‘Ulm he wrote an essay in which
he took it upon himself to:
“become a counsellor and a teacher, giving himself, by day to the children,
and by night to their parents, to the task of teaching ‘the objectives of religion
and the sources of their wellbeing and happiness in life’. He would bring to
this mission ‘perseverance and sacrifice’, study and understanding, and a body
willing to face the hardship and a soul which ‘he had sold to God’. ‘This is a
covenant between me and God’ (Mitchell, 6).
This symbolized the commitment on the part of al-Banna to help guide Egypt back to
the path of what he deemed as morally and religiously right. Al- Banna then accepted
a position in the city of Isma’iliyya in 1928. His post in Isma’iliyya was very life
changing because it eventually inspired him to create the Muslim Brotherhood. He
observed a socio-economic problem amongst the people, according to Mitchell; he
observed the extreme poverty that came because of the abuse of the British
colonialists the Egyptian labour force. Another problem which he observed in Suez
Canal City, was the wide spread of moral breakdown. Ismai’liyya was a post for
British soldiers in which he observed instances such as drinking as well as prostitution
which angered him even further. He blamed the British for the fall of society from the
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teachings of Islam, leading the people to follow similar behaviours as those by the
British. To al-Banna, this was seen as part of the repercussions of the Kemalist
movement which called for the secularization of the state and the complete separation
of religion and state, a matter which was completely unacceptable to al-Banna. This
was seen as part of the corruption of party politics as well, because al-Banna credits
these movements to have corrupted the youth in their efforts to turn Egypt into a
secular society.
Al-Banna blamed the moral downfall of Egypt on the British, “I believe that
my people, because of the political stages which they have passed through them, and
under the impact of western civilization… materialist philosophy and franji traditions,
have departed from the goals of their faith” (Mitchell, 6). He also blamed them for the
political problems that Egypt faced at the time “while the British provided an initial
target, the failure of the Wafd and the intensified struggle in Palestine provided further
openings in the political environment that helped the organization sustain its rapid
mobilization” (Munson, 495). This enforced goals of the group, to eliminate all forms
of foreign influence in Egypt, and to “reconstitute Egypt as an Islamic state”
(Caromba and Solomon, 119). A teacher once suggested to al-Banna and his friends to
organize their group to influence positively the formation of their character and
manners by way of practical training rather than mere abstract lessons. They would
fuse educational theories with the Quran injunction, “to enjoin good and prohibit
wrong,” which actually played a crucial role when he becomes an Islamic activist
(Krämer, 9). During his time in Isma’illya he also worked at creating a grassroots
support network through supporting other religious groups while preaching on his
own. He familiarized himself with the local leaders of the town, a tactic that would
gain him further support in the town. Eventually after several people contacted him
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about creating a new group which would be more effective, he accepted and launched
what would be known as the Society of Muslim Brothers. When he first created the
group he would focus on the:
“construction of a mosque, using funds from membership dues and grants
from local businesses. A boy's school, girl's school, and social club were
subsequently added to the complex as the organization grew. Each new branch
of the Society followed a similar pattern of growth. The organization would
establish a branch headquarters and then immediately begin a public service
project-the construction of a mosque, school, or clinic, the support of a local
handicraft industry, or the organization of a sports program. This private social
service infrastructure grew quickly and became an important part of the
Egyptian social, political, and economic landscape.” (Munson, 496)
These actions would serve as very important to the increase in the membership of the
group because it would gain them more support in the society which they would be
forming. Building these forms of infrastructure would also instil a sense a sense of
loyalty and gratitude in the people and would entrench the group in society.
Hassan al-Banna began to call for direct goals to be applied in society such as
the implication of Sharia which:
“was originally formulated to meet a specific set of historical circumstances
and was thus a product of informed human reasoning. In al-Banna’s view the restored
Shariah would be subject to interpretation and would hence be fully compatible with
the needs of a modern society” (Cleveland, 200).
He took it upon himself to spread the number of followers of his cause while
keeping the contacts he made while he was in Cairo. Al-Banna “sought to find a way
for Muslims to take advantage of the technological advances of the twentieth century
without feeling that they were compromising their commitment to Islamic values”
(Cleveland, 199). This shows how the group was very innovative in its technique in
spreading the message. The call for a more stricter application of Islam in society are
not new, but what made the Muslim Brotherhood different was their approach to
spreading the message by appealing to society at a deeper level through preaching.
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This is how the organization started which is a preaching organization to help apply
Islam better in society, but it eventually evolved past that. Amongst the technological
advancements that the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of was the printing press
technology where they used to print publications to help spread their works across
several mediums not just through preaching. One of the greatest methods that were
utilized by the group to spread their message was the use of newspapers and
magazines. Mitchell comments explaining that the group began spreading a newsletter
and then gradually evolved to the publication of a journal called Majallat al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimin. The use of publications to spread the group’s ideology in the beginning
of the group signifies how the group evolved in order to appeal to more groups as
opposed to simply focusing on those who needed economic benefits, the group
appealed to the educated.
Al-Banna’s group took advantage of the situation in Cairo where the
politicians were busy fighting amongst themselves to appeal to the poor and
disenfranchised through appealing to their religious nature. This helped them gain the
supported they needed in order to make sure that the organization became solidified in
society. The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the calls for secularism in the
state to gain more supporters sympathetic for the cause which was to implement a
more strict form of Shariah. The Islamic identity in the country is one which is of
prime importance and when British colonialism is seen to be threatening this identity
the al-Banna and his supporters were able to use that to their advantage in order to
gain even more members and spread their message of reform. The message of the
group was gradual reform through preaching and basic social reform through
providing social services in order to be able to gain more supporters to help spread
throughout the country. Al-Banna took advantage of the connections he made
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throughout his life in joining the several religious organizations to help spread his
group even more. In the 1930s he merged smaller religious organizations into the
Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain more supporters and branch out into other
governorates. It took him three years after the initial decision to create the group to
move the headquarters to Cairo in order to be able to solve the problems which he
observed in Cairo raging from social problems of morality to economic problems
such as the gap between the rich and the poor which was becoming larger. The
Brotherhood was conceptualized to work on the morality and religiousness of the
individual and society as a whole (Gul, 899). There were no political aspects in its
early intervention as it sought to fill the social services that were being increasingly
neglected by the government. As membership grew and the services expanded, it
found that getting entangled with the political sphere was consequential. So that, even
before they got involved in public administration, al-Banna and the Brotherhood had
already started a cultural Islamization of Egypt through their services that were based
on the love found in Islam; the other effect was the creation of an effective political
network. They also never got tired of preaching to individuals and groups about the
tenets of Islam. In effect, due to the need of change in society, the Brotherhood was
able to generate its interpretation of Islam as a total system. It harboured a
revolutionary idea that would later influence the rest of the Muslim world. Islam was
no longer just a religion; it was an ideology for all times and for all places.
During the interwar period the movement developed greatly into an anticolonial movements which was shaped by many developments in the region such as
the creation of Israel in 1947 and the group was able to influence the issue by keeping
the people speaking about the problem and organized several demonstrations in order
to protest against the British who were seen as the cause of the problem. They
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organizational power of the group was seen in how they created a paramilitary entity
in the group, a secret apparatus which would fight in Palestine, and eventually stay for
decades to come. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood helped by supporting the Arab
Strike during 1936-1936 (Zollner, 12). This organizational strength of the movement
to rally people for issues such as Palestine is the strongest aspect of the group and
would keep the group the greatest opposition for groups such as the Wafd and the
monarchy.
The Secret Apparatus would be used by the Muslim Brotherhood in many acts
of violence domestically. This group carry out attacks against British and Egyptian
Jews who were seen as sympathizers of Zionism. After incriminating evidence of the
existence of the Secret Apparatus Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi ordered a ban
on the group. The Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood would gain the group
stigma and label as a violent organization. By the end of the period of the leadership
of Hassan al-Banna until his assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood would be banned
by the government and Egypt would be placed under martial law. The issue of
Palestine would be very important in the relationship between the state and the
Muslim Brotherhood. Many Egyptians blamed the loss of Palestine on the
government and thus further fuelling the anger against the government, adding
support to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood would also be blamed
for the Black Saturday in which, after the shooting of 50 Egyptian Officers by British
soldiers, mass rioting would erupt where, “burning and looting of some 750 buildings
and the country’s Opera House in downtown Cairo” (Cairo Fire). This would increase
the popularity of the anti-Western sentiment would translate to an increase in the
popularity of opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The achievements of the Muslim Brotherhood from its creation until the time
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of the 1952 Revolution is a reflection of how the group was very innovative. This
period caused the movement to evolve in several ways in accordance to the political
events which were on going in the country. The movement started as a reactionary
movement as it emerged against the attempts to remove Egyptian traditions in order to
modernize the state. The achievements of Hassan al-Banna represented in his ability
to create such a group in light of strong opposition of the existing political forces such
as the Wafd, the British and the monarchy shows the power of the individual in
creating powerful social movements. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged from this
period as a very strong movement; it had gained the trust of a class of people who
were distrustful of the political elite (Soage, 40). The group also proved its value
economically and socially as it’s “schools and hospitals offered crucial services to the
urban working class” (Soage, 40). These services were essential as the group took
advantage of the high levels of inflation that were caused because of wartime
expenses as well as the high levels of unemployment because of the withdrawal of the
Allied Forces to gain more supporters. This support system that the group offered
increased its popularity and undermined the state, further angering the people and
gaining the Muslim Brotherhood more members and sympathizers (Soage, 40). This
support system that the Muslim Brotherhood provides, offering services that the state
fails to provide would be one of the strongest strategies to gain the Muslim
Brotherhood supporters as it shows the group as a viable alternative to the state,
especially during elections and when mobilizing for protests.
3.2 Ideology and Dynamic
The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood has been in constant transformation
since its initial creation. The Muslim Brotherhood drives its ideology from the
teachings of Islam and then applying them to society. The basic school of thought
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which the Muslim Brotherhood derives its ideology from is the Hanbali school of
thought (Munson, 489). Hassan al-Banna sought to elevate the role of religion in the
state, that “Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a
total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the
Muslim world” (Paison, 1).
The ideology of the group was very appealing for average Egyptians because
“rooted in rich Islamic ideas and symbols, was tied to everyday Egyptian life and thus
accessible to potential recruits” (Munson, 507). A characteristic that can be observed
about this group is that it rose in order to preserve the Muslim identity of Egypt in the
face of reforms that were instigated by the European powers which according to alBanna threatened society. When Hassan al-Banna first created the Muslim
Brotherhood, he aimed it at educating people to be better Muslims in return he hoped
to create a change in society, believing that this would lead to an improvement in
society. This change would call for moral reform and also called for basic demands
which would help society such as “as the strengthening of the army, increasing
Egyptian ties with other Arab countries, an expansion of hospitals and clinics, the
banning of usury, improvement of the working conditions of both agricultural and
industrial” (Munson, 490). Al-Banna first started through reaching out to society this
represented a method which would be the greatest asset of the group which is the
ability to reach to society in all of its levels especially the lower classes. This method
of spreading the group’s ideology to all parts of society in their own environment as
opposed to keeping politics central to the main cities of Egypt as other parties did at
the time would prove to be very successful and eventually lead to an increase in the
members all over the country. According to Harvard University scholar Lorenzo
Vidino, who specialized in political Islamic movements, Al-Banna also created social
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programs which would create a bottom up change in society, removing the Western
influence and Islamizing society (Vidino, 2).
During the 1930s the group would meet in a series of conferences and
eventually begin in the formulation of the groups ideology, according to scholar
Richard Mitchell, on the tenth anniversary of the group the members would outline
the ideology of the group after its development for the past ten years. The Muslim
Brotherhood would reach a decision that:
“(1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in
all of its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary
sources and the revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the
Sunna; and (3) an Islam applicable to all times and to all places” (Mitchell,
14).
This is the beginning of the religious ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and it
established its identity as a religious group, it later evolved into trying to apply this
ideology that it turned into a political mission. The group called for “an Islamic state
and held that true Islam was essentially democratic and capable of solving the
problems of the modern world” (Munson, 490). Al-Banna derived his ideology from
his observations of society. One of the most significant aspects of the group’s
ideology is its aversion to party politics, which was because of al-Banna’s observation
that party politics is what caused the lack of unity in Cairo amongst the Egyptians
who are supposed to be the ones responsible for Egypt. This lack of unity enabled the
British to take advantage of the situation and exploit Egyptians.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been in constant evolution in accordance to the
developments in Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology can be
described as a reaction to the developments in Egyptian society. It was first
formulated as a way to enable religious change in society. The decline in religion in
society according to al-Banna was largely due to British imperialism. This notion of
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the effect of the British on society yields the notion that al-Banna and his supporters
observed not just economic and military effects of the British, but also the cultural
imperialism which was symbolized through the Western institutions and ideas which
were built at the time such as cinemas and cafes. According to Mitchell, what the
cultural imperialism represented to al-Banna was more than just cafes and cinemas, it
stemmed deeper since they “brought with them their laws, schools, languages and
sciences; but also ‘their wine women, and sin’” (Mitchell, 224). The schools can be
seen as the largest threat to the Egyptian society by the Muslim Brotherhood, because
it passed on values to a new generation which would then be passed on to further
generations. During the time there was a dual education system, one that was
provided by al Azhar which was “a remnant of Islamic heritage” (Mitchell, 223) and
the other was provided by the west. According Mitchell, Al-Banna saw these
conflicting educational systems as dangerous to society because they caused further
divide in society and the Western educational system promoted the traditions of the
West which would cause even further moral divide in Egypt. The introduction of the
British code of laws, according to al-Banna, were seen as dangerous because they
changed the thought process of society and “perverted the nations thought, mind and
logic” (Mitchell, 223). Al-Banna noted that another reason he is resistant to these laws
is that they do not represent Egyptian society. Al-Banna blamed the enabling of this
change on the ulama which in his view were weak and incompetent. And through the
1930s the Muslim Brotherhood organized mass protests to demand the
implementation of Islamic law, Shariah. This cultural imperialism according to
Mitchell was seen as to have “corrupted society, bred immorality, and destroyed the
traditional values of Muslim society” (Mitchell, 223). Al-Banna’s ideology was a
resistance to this change in society and he saw that the way to stop this process was
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Islam, which explains the origin of the slogan “Islam is the answer” (Vidino, 1).
Al- Banna saw that the imperialism of the Western powers needed to be solved
in order to save the identity of Egyptian society. According to Vidino, al-Banna called
for the establishment of an Islamic state through gradual reform of society to remove
Western influences. Mitchell also comments on this aspect of the Muslim
Brotherhood, noting that the Muslim Brotherhood observed a problem in society and
their solution to this problem was a dawla muslima which translates to a strong
Muslim state. They viewed the teachings of Islam as all inclusive which would
encompass state and society as well. Al-Banna saw that a bottom up approach to the
changes in society was the best possible solution because this would eventually result
in a change in government to reflect the change in society. Al-Banna wanted to reach
this through a dawa based approach which is spreading the message and through
education in society. This was the greatest strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, which
is their complex organization. Lorenzo Vidino explains that the organization under
Hassan al-Banna adopted:
“a capillary structure that included mosques, professional organizations, charities,
social services, and publications. Internally, the Brotherhood subdivided itself into
a myriad of sub-organizations and committees, each with a very precise structure
and goal” (Vidino, 2).
This structure provided great success for the movement as in less than 20 years the
organizations’ number of members to increase exponentially with over half a million
members and millions of sympathizers everywhere in the country, as its message
targeted the lower middle class as well as disfranchised which made up a large portion
of Egyptian society. Groups with ideologies such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s are
very popular and gain many supporters because “offering a reaffirmation of
traditional beliefs and an outlet for the frustrations of anomic social conditions
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brought on by rapid population expansion, urbanization, and industrialization”
(Munson, 491).
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3.2.1 Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood

Figure 1: The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell, 194)
This structure of the Muslim Brotherhood was introduced under the leadership
of Hassan al Banna where he first began transforming the organization and giving it a
specific structure. This structure is very important to the success of the organization
since its creation as it enabled and continued to enable it to be a strong player on the
political as well as the social front. The reforms which were proposed under Hassan
al-Banna were later adopted by the second General Guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi. These
reforms were seen as necessary in order to maintain the activities of the group and to
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ensure specialization, so that different groups can work in the different fields where
they are the most experienced thus achieving efficiency in the group. The family
section of the group is as it helps address a problem that al-Banna observed in society
which is the lack of morals in society. This observation is seen to have influenced this
sector of the group, according to Mitchell, the purpose is “to achieve fulfilment of the
meaning of Islam among the Brothers” (Mitchel, 195). This family can be seen as a
building block in the organization and is aimed to strengthen the ideology within the
group itself and to help create a stronger foundation within the group. One important
aspect in the hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood is that it uses democratic methods
to elect its General Guide. Members elect their General Guide through direct voting in
which the guide serves a certain term. The top hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood,
called the Guidance Office, always composed of 15 senior members and among them,
there was a Supreme Guide. Each member of this office had his own jurisdiction:
education, university recruitment, or politics, and each Guidance Office member had
his own deputy in each jurisdiction for every region in Egypt. This chain of command
proved advantageous in the sense that communication was a two-way process,
efficient and effective. The hierarchy of the organization also inspires loyalty within
the group and instils a sense of commitment to the group as it enables them to be part
of a larger organization. In the group:
“First-level members were called "assistants" and were required only to sign a
membership card and pay dues. At the second level were "related" members
who were required to demonstrate a knowledge of the Society's principles,
attend meetings regularly, and perform an oath of obedience. Third-level
members were called "active" and were expected to entirely immerse their lives
in the organization, including high achievement in Quranic learning, observance
of all Islamic obligations, and regular physical training” (Munson, 497).
The structure within the group values loyalty and its strict structure has
allowed it to survive the regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak who have tried to
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destroy the groups, yet the ability to mobilize through this efficient system has
enabled the group to be able to be a part of Egyptian politics for decades. This
structure is not by coincidence as scholar Samuel Tadros explains in an interview with
the Deputy General Guide Khairat El- Shater, “He attributes Banna’s methodology
and the structure he invented to the Prophet himself. He quotes the Caliph Omar as
saying, “there is no religion without a Gama’a and no Gama’a without an Imam, and
no Imam without obedience” (Tadros, 2013). This specific example is meant that:
“this means officials, structure and groups; a particular structure, not just a matter of
circumstances. This structure also needs to be obeyed and committed to.” He stresses
the point further by arguing that, “not any gathering is a Gama’a, even if it was a
group of good people who are committed to Islam; they are not a Gama’a as such
without their structures and officials, no system, commitment, and obedience”
(Tadros, 2013).
An important theme when studying the development of the Muslim
Brotherhood is looking at the group’s paramilitary activities. During the group’s
initial political activities protesting for the implementation of Islamic law, there were
several confrontations with the security forces which often turned violent. These
confrontations with the state led to the group establishing what would be known as
the Secret Apparatus which would the group’s paramilitary sector which would be
responsible for protecting the group from the security forces as well as the
government. According to Mitchel, the original date of the creation of this group is
unknown, but is estimated to be in the late 1930s. The group began setting up training
camps to train members who were very loyal to the group in order to better help
protect the group.
The shift in the group can be noticed as it became obvious that gradual reform
was not going to be able to achieve the group’s dream of an Islamic society. This
feeling was accompanied by a sense of betrayal of officials who did not sympathize
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with the group or its calls for Islamic reform caused the group to turn against the
government. A series of historical developments in the region were instrumental to the
evolution of the group. In the early 1940s the appointment of Nahas Pasha despite
King Farouk’s wishes caused a large sense of betrayal amongst the Egyptians and
increased the anti-Western sentiment in Egypt as this was seen as an infringement on
Egyptian affairs. This helped the Muslim Brotherhood gain even more supporters
because of its anti-Western sentiments. The creation of the state of Israel was seen as
the largest failure of the government, and the Muslim Brotherhood blamed the
government for the loss of Palestinian land. The creation of Israel becomes the most
influential event to the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately redefines
its relationship with the government. The creation of Israel ushers a wave of antigovernmental protests as well as multiple assassination attempts and successes against
prominent figures in Egyptian politics in 1948. This wave of violence causes the
government to ban the group in December of 1948 (Mitchell, 67). In February of the
following year Hassan al-Banna was assassinated with debates rising, some blaming
the government, others blaming the group itself.
The use of violence in the group goes against the doctrine of gradual reform
which was first undertaken by the group, but with the lack of observable
achievements on the ground as well as how slow this process was, many members
grew impatient. The ideology of Sayid Qutb represented the splinter group which
arose from the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was born in 1906 and received similar
education as al-Banna (Gresh, 213). His ideology began when he was studying abroad
in the United States and he witnessed American culture and was shocked at aspects
such as mixed gender dances, which started his anti-Western sentiment. Sayyid Qutb
actually joined the Muslim Brotherhood after al-Banna’s death. He became a member
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after his return from the United States, where he studied educational administration.
Qutb gradually assumed ideological leadership of the Brotherhood as he sought to
refine al-Banna’s ideologies (Mideastweb). Qutb’s ideology radicalized the approach
of some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayid Qutb was one of the Islamists
that were arrested during Nasser’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, his time
spent in jail helped formulate his ideology. Like Hassan al-Banna, Qutb identified a
problem, which was the “horrors, he witnessed in detention” (Vidino, 4), and decided
that gradual reform was a process that was too slow. He also identified that foreign
powers were making this process of gradual reform impossible as it was met by
internal resistance by the government in addition to the external resistance. According
to Qutb’s ideology, the Muslims that exist today are not truly Muslims because they
are being ruled by manmade laws and as such they are living in jahili societies
(Soage, 42). According to Qutb:
“Either Islam or jahiliyya. There is no intermediate state half-Islam and halfjahiliyya that Islam can accept. Islam clearly indicates that the truth is one, not
multiple, that everything that is not truth is perdition, and that the two cannot
be mixed. Either God’s government or jahiliyya government. Either God’s
Shariah or human caprice.” (Qutb, 201)
Qutb’s solution was for people to embrace the concepts of takfir and jihad. To
Qutb, any ruler who was “refusing to implement Shariah and establish authentic
Islamic states” would be declared a non-believer and have abandoned Islam (Vidino,
4). By takfir, the ruler would be declared a kafir and a non-believer and then those
who wanted to establish an Islamic state, those who according to Qutb are “true”
Muslims must overthrow and kill these rulers to achieve their goal of an Islamic state.
According to Vidino, Qutb criticized the use of gradual reform through dawa, saying
it cannot achieve the goal of an Islamic state as much as waging jihad using violent
confrontation. Qutb was hanged in 1966, but through his death he was seen as a
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martyr and his popularity was increased and groups from within the Muslim
Brotherhood broke off to create other groups who would allocate Qutb’s approach to
change.
Thinkers such as al-Banna and Qutb show how an individual can be very
influential to launching a movement and affecting society. Within the main
organization, the General Guide is also very influential to the group and its activities.
Within the Muslim Brotherhood there were liberal members as well as more
conservative members. This is a representation of the ideological divide which existed
in the group. The first General Guide elected after Hassan al-Banna was Hasan alHudaybi who brings the Brotherhood’s ideology back to its roots, by arguing that the
purpose of the group has always been education as opposed to takfir and jihad and
criticized using such methods because Muslims should not judge other Muslims
(Vidino, 4). Al-Hudaybi’s work represented a move towards unity and his more
liberal approach to the Muslim Brotherhood and its role in society. This liberal
approach can be seen through his instance that the Secret Apparatus be dismantled as
well as his clean break from the ideology of Sayid Qutb. Under the leadership of
Umar al Tilmisani the group also shifted to a more accepting role in the Egyptian
politics. This accepting role meant participating within Egyptian politics and running
as independents as opposed to opposing the government. Despite these movements to
lead the Muslim Brotherhood away from this radicalization and disbanding of the
Secret Apparatus, the Brotherhood has not completely moved away from violence.
According to Vidino, the Muslim Brotherhood still sees that violence can be a means
to an end when achieving goals. This view is reflected in how the group supports
violent organizations such as Hamas and suicide attacks in areas such as Palestine and
Afghanistan, yet at the same time condoning groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliated
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groups. Newer members who are indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood are
taught the works of all these thinkers, and this can be conflicting due to the different
ideologies, creating an ideological divide within the Muslim Brotherhood itself.
3.3: The Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser
The Muslim Brotherhood had a very active role in the build-up to the 1952
Revolution. During the British colonial era there was a high anti-Western sentiment as
the British were seen as the cause of socio-economic problems that Egypt was going
through, this in return added to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood with it
being a social movement that provided goods and services to the people and opposed
Western colonialism to a large degree by 1959, “the organization had over two
thousand branches throughout Egypt and between 300,000 and 600,000 active
members-the largest organized force in the country” (Munson, 489). In the 1952
Revolution a group of officers led a coup against King Farouk and successfully
removed the king from rule and took over. These officers would then be named the
Free Officers and their movement would instigate a republic in Egypt and would
cement the role of the military in politics. This coup was widely supported by the
people and ushered an ear of social, political and economic reform.
While there are no official records to prove the participation of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the coup, authors Ana Soage and J.F Frangnillio comment saying that
“informed sources claim that the Muslim Brotherhood played a significant role in the
coup” (Soage, 41). They also comment on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in this
coup saying that the military cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to
successfully carry out this coup. They speculate that there was a possibility that
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat could have possibly been members of the
Secret Apparatus. The Muslim Brotherhood used their grassroots support system in
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order to mobilize people for the military.
There has been a long relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the
state. During the initial years of the coup there is a change in the Muslim
Brotherhood, instead of fighting the state, they cooperate with the Revolutionary
Command Council, the group which was leading the post-revolutionary Egypt, in
state building measures such as in negotiations about government formation. The first
sign of the cooperation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military occurred when in
1953 all political parties were banned yet the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood was
removed and the group was allowed to continue its actions as an organization. The
banning of all parties can be seen as an attempt to promote unity and a failure of the
previous political system to satisfy the needs of the people. The Muslim Brotherhood
were also offered a part in the subsequent state building efforts. Sayid Qutb, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood was offered a position in the Liberation Rally.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with the Free Officers deteriorated rapidly.
Based on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, their main focus was the role of
religion in Egypt, and their solution to the widespread problems was the application
of Shariah. The Muslim Brotherhood saw this as an opportunity and a tool to apply
their version of an Islamic state. The state refused these requests and as such the
Muslim Brotherhood returned to its position as opposition to the state. The Muslim
Brotherhood began to openly demonstrate against the military. They were able to rally
their supporters against the military with the demand of the “return to civilian rule”
(Soage, 41). An important observation about this time in the history of the Muslim
Brotherhood is whether the group would have protested if the state had agreed with
their demands. These protests were in unison with the Communists which is
conflicting because of their opposing views of the role of religion and state.
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The relationship reached its worst level when one of the members of the
Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser. By the time
of this assassination attempt Nasser had consolidated power and made himself
president. His nationalist based policies aimed at social equality combined with his
humble middle class background and his charisma made him very popular amongst
Egyptians. This assassination attempt only increased the popularity of Nasser and
gave him the ability to be able to move against the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser jailed
and tortured thousands of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and put them on
trial. The regime prosecuted not just members but also leaders such as Hasan alHudaybi, who was amongst those who received the death penalty, but his sentence
was reduced to life in prison. This move against the Muslim Brotherhood would be
one of the most important developments in the movement a whole for several reasons.
The first reason is that many of the members escaped these sentences and travelled to
many countries around the world to countries such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
countries. When they travelled they became members of the communities of the
countries which they travelled to and became doctors and lawyers. These members
began founding other chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries in the
Middle East. This was very successful because of the nature of the ideology of the
Muslim Brotherhood. The notion of social equality and piousness appealed to the
largely Muslim populations. This turned the Egyptian movement into a global
movement, one that surpassed Egyptian borders.
The other reason why this development was very important to the evolution of
the Muslim Brotherhood is that it caused many of its members to go underground in
fear of persecution. The imprisonment of many of the members produced many
radical ideologies such as those of Sayid Qutb, who called for jihad against unjust
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rulers. The Brotherhood went through several security clamp downs. In one of those
authors Soage and Franganillo comment that Qutb’s book Ma’alim was so popular
that it “was found in every house the police searched” (Soage, 42). This book was
used as evidence against Qutb to prove that these Islamists were planning a coup.
Despite the crackdown that was occurring on the Muslim Brotherhood had a large
number of members estimated to be between 250,000 to 300,000 (Soage, 41). The
crushing defeat of Egypt in the Six-Day War and Nasser’s subsequent attempt at
resignation only helped increase the popularity of Nasser, yet at the same time
Islamists used this defeat to say that it punishment from God for not following God’s
laws (Soage, 42). This approach shows the groups use of religious rhetoric in politics,
one of the defining characteristics and tactics used by the group.
Another important effect the Nasser era had on the Muslim Brotherhood is
that it caused a divide within the group, because the newer members criticized the
older members for their passiveness about dealing with Nasser’s crackdown and
broke off the Muslim Brotherhood to create their own group which was inspired by
Qutb’s idea. Sayid Qutb was executed and as such his followers considered him a
martyr. The Nasser era shaped the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and marked
the beginning of them becoming a global movement and making them a banned group
in Egypt and dissolved the group in 1952.
3.4: The Muslim Brotherhood Under Sadat
The period of the Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Sadat can be described
as the comeback of the Muslim Brotherhood. When Sadat took over after Nasser, who
died from a heart attack, he became a strong ruler which was a surprise because
members of the Nasser regime assumed he was a general with a weak personality.
This was beneficial for the RCC because it meant that Sadat would not challenge their
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power. Yet when Sadat came to power what he did was marginalize the Nasserists as
well as the socialists in his attempts to consolidate power. After those who saw that
the loss in the Six Day War as a result of people straying away from God’s laws,
Sadat had state controlled media refer to him as al-ra’is al-mu’min which translates to
the pious one. This could be seen as an attempt by Sadat to gain more legitimacy after
Nasser. Nasser was well known for being the people’s president as a source of his
legitimacy; Sadat took the more religious oriented title in order to appeal to the people
as well as to quell his Islamist opposition. Sadat had started attempts to democratise
the country through releasing political prisoners which were imprisoned during the
time of Nasser. These include the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were
freed and allowed to operate as opposition. This was a tactic as Mona al-Ghobashy
explains it to de-Nasserize the state, as the Muslim Brotherhood ideology would
balance out the socialist left. The Brothers were tolerated by the state to continue their
charity projects but despite their attempts they would never become a legal political
party.
The role of religion in politics is very important during the term of Sadat, one
important development in the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the state
is the addition of Article 2 in the constitution which stipulates that Islam is the
religion of the state, this can be seen as an appeasement to the increasing parts of
Egypt who were demanding the implementation of Islamic law, a sentiment that the
Muslim Brotherhood used to their advantage to attract more supporters.
The Sadat era in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood helped shape the
actions of the group for years to come. During the time of Sadat, Umar al-Tilmisani
was appointed as the new General Guide and his philosophy was to cooperate with
state politics. Authors Soage and Franganillo see the time under the leadership al-
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Tilmisani as one which “the Brothers recovered some of their prominence” (Soage,
43). This can be credited to several reasons, one of which is that because under the era
of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood’s student movement expanded. With Sadat
releasing the Muslim Brotherhood members from jail they were able to recruit new
members from universities. These new members can be characterized as younger
people who have legitimate criticisms of the regime such as Sadat’s attempt at
democratization which was only partial, he allowed the release of some opposition to
practice politics, but since it still included arresting members of the opposition who
refused to work within the parameters he allowed them. These university students
were lower class and were “disillusioned by the gap between their high expectations
and the grim realities of the low-paying, unchallenging civil service positions to
which they were consigned” (Cleveland, 382) This new generation were also less
radical than previous generations as they were made up of more educated students,
this made it possible for the organization to remerge after the damage that Nasser had
done. Under the leadership of al-Tilmisani the Muslim Brotherhood would later on
participate in elections such as parliamentary elections and union elections. First, the
Muslim Brotherhood decided that political activity was essential for the application of
its agenda and thus, fielded candidates in the national elections of 1941 and 1945
(Stilt 77), but they participated under the independent ticket in order to avoid getting
arrested by the state. This was gradual participation in politics in order to stay off the
radar of the regime and avoid confrontation. The Muslim Brotherhood also sought
legal status while under Sadat, but due to the authoritarian nature of Sadat this would
never happen.
After the 6th of October War the popularity of Sadat increased, but it was short
lived, because as soon as he agreed to sign the Camp David Treaty he was criticized
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for cooperating with Israel. This issue was specifically important to the Muslim
Brotherhood given how important the issue of Palestine was to the group’s ideology.
This peace treaty had Sadat labelled as a traitor by his opposition. This launched the
Qutbist segment of the Muslim Brotherhood who were made up of members “who
were driven by a mixture of religious belief, social despair, and economic
deprivation” (Cleveland, 382) these members of the jihadist faction “rejected the
Sadat regime as impious and claimed that it was an Islamic duty to work for its
overthrow and replacement by a government committed to the restoration of the
Shariah” (Cleveland, 382). Sadat was also criticized for his infitah policy which did
not benefit the poor. The Muslim Brotherhood capitalized on the unpopularity of these
measures and due to their intricate support system of charities was to still increase the
number of its members and sympathizers. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to use
its newspaper al-Da’wa in order to openly criticize Sadat and his polices and mass
distributed it to the people.
After the opposition kept increasing against Sadat, the president started a
crackdown against opposition. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested as
well as many of the secular opposition. This was due to Sadat transforming into an
authoritarian ruler, despite his attempts at democratic reform. This can be seen as a
way to ensure that people would not revolt against his infitah or open door policies.
These measures were criticized as catering to the West as opposed to the people. The
Bread Riots were seen as an example of how unpopular the measures were. When
Sadat removed the bread subsidies there were mass riots marked by clashes with
security and violence in Egypt which prompted Sadat to change the policy in the face
of mass riots. The crackdown on Islamists along with the Sadat’s relationship with
Israel was the breaking point in the relationship between the radicalized factions of
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the Muslim Brotherhood which resulted in Sadat’s assassination on October 6th.

3.5: Muslim Brotherhood Under Mubarak
The evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak is very important to
understanding Muslim Brotherhood’s development which led their success in the
January 25 Revolution. During the reign of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood began
fully participating in politics through elections. When Mubarak assumed power, he
instilled the state of emergency, which allowed him to further consolidate power.
Using the state of emergency is considered a legal tool in authoritarian regimes
because it enables them to arrest opposition in the name of national security. It also
meant that the state had the limit the right to assembly and freedom of speech. After
the assassination of President Sadat by radical Islamists Mubarak instigated mass
arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members using the state of emergency law as his
justification. The state of emergency was not only used with the Islamists it was also
used with the liberal, Mubarak “used the climate of crisis created by the radical
insurgents in the 1990s to crack down on the moderates as well, arresting journalists
and prominent individuals associated with the centrists, limiting their access to the
media, and censoring their publications” (Cleveland, 545). The state of emergency
directly affected the Muslim Brotherhood since the law affected the right to assembly,
the society was unable to meet in order to elect its General Guide which led to a series
of appointed leaders, effectively diminishing the “democratic” method within the
society itself. In the 1980s, al-Tilmiasni convinced the Muslim Brotherhood to take
another path than violence in order to fulfil their goals and ideology, as al-Tilmisani
comments:
“When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of nearrecession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without
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troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the
views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the
new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it
slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the
neglectful” (Al-Tilmisany, 212).
In the next three decades the Muslim Brotherhood began accepting electoral
politics and engaging in them in order to gain seats in syndicates and the People’s
Assembly. This gradual participation in the elections helped shape the image of the
Muslim Brotherhood as viable opposition not just simply organizers of charity
projects. Mona El-Ghobashy describes the Brotherhood as “consummate political
actors, neither extraordinary gifted at mobilization nor historically adept at deception”
(El-Ghobashy, 374). This statement accurately explains the situation of the Brothers,
yet what is extraordinary is their ability to survive three rulers who despite the best
attempts at undermining them would still exist and evolve to bypass the laws of the
state and survive to be the most organized group when Mubarak was deposed. It
adopted three strategies to accomplish the following: the use of democratic process,
which drew popular support from the public; the domination over student and
professional unions by harnessing the democratic process; and the creation of social
services networks that provided “food, jobs, healthcare and a sense of community to
Egyptians” (Caromba and Solomon, 120).
The first step that the Muslim Brotherhood took was through taking over the
unions. The unions in Egypt are very important “they provide access to the job market
and offer benefits such as loans, subsidized goods, and inexpensive health insurance”
(Soage, 44). They were very successful in this venture and eventually would control
many of the 24 unions such as the Student Union and the Doctor’s Union. This would
be very helpful to the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood because it further added
to their grassroots support and granted them access to considerable power. This would
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help further their image as opposition to the regime who can offer goods and services
that the government did not. According to authors Soage and Franganillio the Muslim
Brotherhood while participating in this process, its criticisms undermine these efforts.
These criticisms include their tactics at gaining votes such as through paying
membership fees for all of its members who were participating in these unions.
Another tactic that the Brothers were accused of included using religion in politics, by
saying phrases such as “Are you giving your vote to God?” These tactics were illegal
and can be seen as bribery in order to get more votes. The Brotherhood used these
unions as a platform for their political ideas and gained more supporters. Through
their participation in these unions any accomplishments that they had were credited to
the movement as a whole, further gaining them more supporters.
The movement also expanded in participating in direct politics by running for
seats in the People’s Assembly. Under the reign of Mubarak the Muslim Brotherhood
would apply for a party several times but would never achieve one. In order to bypass
the government’s state of emergency the Brotherhood would create alliances with the
Wafd Party in order to get the opportunity to run for elections. In the 1984 elections
they won eight seats in addition to two independent seats (Soage, 45). In the 1987
elections the Muslim Brotherhood made alliances with ideologically weak parties in
order to gain more power on the political scene to implement their own ideology and
goals such as the implementation of Shariah (Soage, 45). An example of such a party
is the Labour Party in which El-Ghobashy explains that there was a “progressive
Islamization” through using slogans such as “Islam is the solution” (El-Ghobashy,
379). This evolution in the Muslim Brotherhood shows how they evolve to meet the
existing system in order to bypass state laws which are set against them in order to
survive. In the parliamentary elections there is a crossover between the Brotherhood’s
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participation in union elections and the results of the parliamentary elections. General
Guide Mustafa Mashour comments on the results:
“We must benefit from the experience of elections, for elections are an art with its
own rules, expertise, and requirements, and we must push those who have given
up on reforming the nation, push them to get rid of their pessimism and register to
vote as soon as possible” (El-Ghobashy 380).
This shows how the Brotherhood have evolved past their earlier years of
political activities which involved violence on their part. The Muslim Brotherhood’s
candidates are seen by the people as “accessible to the people of their constituency
and the society candidates freely engaged with their local community” (Soage, 45).
This shows how the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in politics through their efforts
of appealing to people by sending the image that they are active members of society
and are a viable alternative to the state, which would gain them further popularity.
Their participation in elections showed how strong the Muslim Brotherhood is and
how it has the ability to mobilize its supporters against the ruling regime and actually
win.
The society avoided a direct clash with the state in order to prevent further
mass arrests. The Mubarak regime just like under Sadat tolerated the charity functions
of the Muslim Brotherhood, in return for the society not crossing the regime’s “red
lines” (Soage, 45). These red lines were considered anything that threatened the
authority of the regime, but what the regime did not anticipate was the strength of the
charity functions would have in solidifying the Muslim Brotherhood and gaining it
more supporters. This also highlights the growing gap that was developing between
the regime and the people, which the Muslim Brotherhood took full advantage of.
Despite the warning the Muslim Brotherhood did clash with the state in the 1990
elections when they boycotted the elections. The reason this caused problems for the
regime was because it undermined their image in front of the world. Following this
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there was a crackdown by the state as a response, through further curtailing the little
freedom that the Brotherhood had through arresting members and raiding offices.
Authors Soage and Franganillo comment on the incident in which in 1992 the
government raided the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood in which they found
documents which belonged to the Secret Apparatus which allegedly revealed plans of
the society to infiltrate the government through unions. The government would use
evidence such as this in a media war in order to discredit the organization, but with
little success. In 1992, through the Lawyers Syndicate, the Brothers would manage to
anger the state again and after their mass successes in the union elections the regime
would pass a new syndicate law which would severely limit the participation of the
Brothers effectively removing them from unions, and even with mass demonstrations
the regime would oppose them violently (Soage, 48). This is a tactic the regime uses
to control opposition, just like with the state of emergency, the Mubarak regime
would use legal tactics to control the opposition and further help their own political
gains. This tool would be effective as the Brother’s control of unions such as the
student unions and the lawyers union would decrease.
The Brotherhood would compete again in the 1995 elections and would field
170 candidates and only one would be elected and further disqualified (Soage, 48).
One important observation of elections to come is that they become filled with
independent candidates which suggest how little political parties were accepted,
further showing authoritarian tactics that were taken by the regime to consolidate
power. Authors Soage and Franganillo comment saying that these elections were the
“most corrupt and violent since Mubarak became president” (Soage, 48). The
violence was also another tactic taken by the regime to intimate and scare opposition
away. The Muslim Brotherhood’s was not only participating through politics to gain

Al Khalifa 58
supporters, they were also continuing their charity services the most important
example was the 1992 earthquake in which the society was very well organized and
was able to help many people in need, further showing the incompetence of the
government and increasing their image as viable opposition.
The Muslim Brotherhood under the reign of Mubarak was also going through
deep ideological changes. The three decades were marred with ideological splits and
internal divide as a result, all of which help develop the group further. The society’s
acceptance of electoral politics conflicted with the initial ideology of its creator
Hassan al-Banna who thought that party politics lead to disunity in the state, and
within the group there existed a group which wanted to continue this belief, but the
group had to evolve to suit the developments that society which was democratic
transition. According to scholar Mona El-Ghobashy there were deep ideological
conflicts within the group because of the generational gaps that existed between the
members in the organization. According to her that one aspect of the conflict in
ideology stems from the different generations, the older generation which she
describes as the “older prison generation” and the younger generation. This can be
very important for the development as internal conflicts can lead to reform in
ideology. A change in ideology came with the group’s participation in elections where
they began to explain democracy through Islamic terms. These include things such as
comparing the Prophet’s principle of Shura to democratic institutions such as the
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council. This is a bridge of generations and a
reformation of ideology for the group as it evolves to adapt in a world where electoral
democracy is one of the accepted forms of political participation.
In the period of 1995 to 2000 there were ideological conflicts within the group
due to the inability of the older generation of accepting many of the reforms that were
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needed for the group to change its image. One such example was when Mustafa
Mashour a supporter of the Secret Apparatus released a statement in support of an
Islamic state; Copts should be barred from higher political posts and should also pay
jizya which is a special tax that Christians would pay for protection by the state (ElGhobashy, 386). This represents the differences in ideology that exists within the
group. The divide resulted in a serious split within the Muslim Brotherhood in which
group of the younger generation wanted to create their own party. The youth felt that
the older generations were making decisions that were not in the best of the group and
felt that they were holding on to ideas such as distrust of the multiparty system. The
younger generation also disagreed with many of the main ideas and notions of the
group such as the source of authority which the youth felt should be popular
sovereignty and the older generation felt it should be Shariah. All these differences
eventually led to members submitting the application to create a new party called
Hizb al-Wasat. The members that submitted this application were effectively kicked
out of the group because they did not do this with the permission of the General
Guide, which directly conflicts with the concept of loyalty within the group (Soage,
49). This change represented an evolution within the group, which is that the ideology
is reforming generation by generation and in effect this will change the way the
society deals with politics. This application was denied, and many members which
had initially supported this venture returned to the group, others maintained their
ideas. An important part of the ideological change in the Muslim Brotherhood
occurred in 2004 under Mahdi Akif the General Guide at the time in which he
released a manifesto that explain the position of the Muslim Brotherhood on several
issues such as equality between Copts and Muslims, offering “Islam as a solution to
the moral crisis provoked by the neglect of traditional values and Western influence”

Al Khalifa 60
(Soage, 50). The manifesto also spoke of the Brothers complete support of democracy
and all its institutions, these changes represented a new beginning for the society and
portray how the ideology has evolved from its initial creation. These ideas show how
the Muslim Brotherhood evolved in order to participate in politics. This can also be
seen as a continuation of their gradual reform policy, through working on the ground
level through charity activities and also working through politics to try to bring
change, but these efforts were hampered by the regime.
The state was beginning to feel threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood and
their increasing popularity. After the war on Iraq in which all countries in the Middle
East began instigating reforms towards democracy in fear of American military
intervention. The 2005 elections won the Muslim Brotherhood 88 seats in the
People’s Assembly which caused fear for the regime about the rising popularity of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Another development by the regime to curtail the participation
of the society was in 2007 when the People’s Assembly passed a law which
specifically banned the use of Islam in a political context and the “possibility of
excluding independent candidates from running elections” (Soage, 51). This is
another way in which the regime used legal tactics to contain the opposition. This
particular development would be detrimental to the success of the Muslim
Brotherhood, since they primarily ran as independents. They also further extended the
state of emergency which would also give the regime the opportunity to keep
arresting opposition. All these events can be understood by looking at events in the
region such as Hamas winning the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 which the
regime directly responded to by ensuring that similar results would not happen to
Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood reacted through releasing statements against the
regime. In 2007, as a result of increasing popularity of Brotherhood candidates
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challenging Mubarak for the presidency, the despot instituted sweeping constitutional
reforms that vested upon him the authority to disband parliament, prohibit religious
political parties, “weaken judicial oversight of elections, and grant the government
new security powers” (Caromba and Solomon 120). The regime continued to curtail
the opposition until the 2010 parliamentary elections in which the regime won an
overwhelming majority through corrupt means such as police intimidation and ballot
rigging. Allegations of massive electoral fraud began circulating in the country.
Ultimately, the Brotherhood joined forces with all of the opposition parties that
participated in the election and announced a boycott of the 2010 parliamentary
elections. As a result, the NDP, underestimating the strength of the Muslim
Brotherhood managed to lose a considerable amount of seats, only gaining 80% of the
seats (Angrist) . This continued repression only fuelled the popularity of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood and the regime helped shape each other. The
authoritarian tactics of the regime helped show the Muslim Brotherhood in a light that
made them look as fighters for democracy, in return increasing their popularity and
credibility. As a result, the Mubarak regime continually tried to discredit the
Brotherhood by depicting the group as a radical Islamist group that would send back
Egypt to the practices of the Middle Ages which increased the fear of the people from
Muslim Brotherhood and avoid voting for the Brothers to prevent the results. All
these crimes committed by regime eventually resulted in the 2011 Revolution against
corruption, demanding democracy.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the State
The Muslim Brotherhood developed under the several regimes and has
adapted to survive. This evolution from a charitable, dawa based organization to a
political movement. According to scholar Bruce K. Rutherford, the Brotherhood
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would achieve its goals through four main tactics, missionary work, education,
indoctrination and actions such as building mosques, schools, and social service
clinics. The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state is a very
complex one. The authoritarian regimes of Egypt have cracked down and relaxed on
the practices of the group depending on their own needs and interests. Nasser use the
group against British, and then cracked down on the group to consolidate his power.
Sadat used the group to balance the influence of the Soviets and then allowed them
limited activity. Mubarak was harsher than Sadat with the treatment of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and yet he allowed them to participate in elections and run as
independents.
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the authoritarian regimes helped shape each
other. The Muslim Brotherhood’s image was shaped by the media of the regime,
showing them as terrorists as well as phrasing the political scene to the people as
either the regime or chaos under the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood
helped highlight the regime as being harsh and stifling. The Muslim Brotherhood also
utilized its resources abroad to publish works on Islam and governance to help spread
their doctrine. These resources have helped highlight the political goals of
establishing a form of Islamic constitutionalism. Rutherford contends that the phrase
in of itself is very vague in its details in how to govern. This observation becomes
very obvious in the post 2011 Egypt, where after the Brotherhood gained power came
the trouble in finding what the role Islam plays in governance and in the constitution.

Chapter 4: The Muslim Brotherhood after the 2011 Revolution
4.1: January 25, 2011: Revolution
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The January 2011 Revolution took the world by surprise and brought the end
of what was thought as one of the strongest authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
Young activities employed tools such as social media to begin gathering support for
mass protests that they planned for January 25, 2011. The protests were organized by
several groups, amongst the most significant was Google Inc.'s Middle East and North
Africa marketing division’s executive, Wael Ghonim, who encouraged people to
assemble at Tahrir Square. Ghoneim was the creator of the Facebook group "We Are
All Khaled Saeed". This group was created in order to bring to light the case of
activist Khaled Saeed who was killed as a result of police brutality and whose
perpetrators were never brought to justice. The use of social media in the 2011
Revolution would prove essential to launch many of the movements that organized
the 2011 Revolution. Internet and social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook
gave activists the outlet necessary to meet other activists with similar ideas, debate
ideas, and gain new information. These outlets were impossible for the regime to
completely monitor which enabled a section of society to be more politically aware
and exposed to global notions such as democracy and peaceful resistance. The
protesters were mostly young people, who had been actively using social networking
sites Twitter and Facebook to encourage each other activists with similar interests in
their issues to take to the streets and protest.
Emboldened by the success in the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the
organizers who in return spread the plan to those who had no access to computer or
Internet and as such hundreds of thousands of people took to the street in the 25th of
January with the basic demand of an end to police brutality, no to the illegal inheriting
of power from Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak, and the demand for social justice.
Dictatorial regimes have a difficulty of keeping a nation under its control when most
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of the other governments in the world are elected and have limited number of years to
stay in service (Britannica para 3). Authoritarian regimes such as Mubarak had to deal
with the issue of globalization in which ideas such as democracy would spread fast
and helping increase awareness of the population increasing the difficulty of the
regime keeping control. Some sectors of society will soon realize the necessary need
to change the regime in order to address current social conditions, which they viewed
as not being equal or just. As an authoritarian regime, Mubarak controlled most of the
decisions of the state and used his security apparatus to enforce them. And the control
that Mubarak delegated he gave to a close group of people he trusted to keep his
interests and in return they reaped the benefits. The government was notoriously
corrupt and nepotistic, with much wealth and power distributed among Mubarak’s
immediate family and close allies. This prevented the trickle effect from occurring
resulting in only a certain segment of society benefitting which led to an increasing
gap between the rich and the poor, high levels of unemployment poor services such as
health services and education services because many of the individuals responsible
were corrupt (Matchett). At that time, it was the Brotherhood that would continually
provide the much needed social services for the people. In return, the Brotherhood
would be building its solid support base, first from the masses, eventually
incorporating a broad alliance of professionals helping increase the good image of the
group in front of society. The discontent over the dire situation was increasing over
the span of the rule of Mubarak. The fear factor in the general population prevented
the events to happen earlier and with no clear leaders, the grievances kept increasing.
With the 2011 Revolution the opportunity arose that they would have to make their
grievances heard (Tadros, 2013).
Late into January 2011, Washington and the rest of the world acknowledged
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that Egypt was under authoritarian rule, and despite what was occurring on ground, it
maintained that the regime was stable. The regime that was ruling it for many decades
remained in power and seemed to be able to control its people and the events in the
country without difficulty. To many states and scholars such as Michele Angrist
everything appeared in order in the country, as there were no indications that a radical
change was going to occur. Angrist, in her evaluation of the authoritarian trends in the
Middle East in her book Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East,
written before the Arab Spring, concluded that there seems to be no signs of a radical
change to disrupt the status quo in the Middle East. Egypt’s powerful regime did not
appear to be weakening and the security apparatus seemed to be successful in tamping
signs of aggravated discontent over those who were in power for so long. Mubarak
was believed to be staying in power indefinitely, just like some dictators in the Arab
world (Britannica para 6).
The determination of these young activists resulted in speedy triumph and
enflamed optimism that finally, the Middle East could take part in an increasingly
democratic world, something that they could only hear about in other nations (Trager,
114). The initial phase of the 18 days Mubarak tried to use his security apparatus to
once again tamp down the discontent, but was ultimately unsuccessful resulting in the
police withdrawing from the street and the deployment of the military to establish
control in the country. The military sided with the people and promised to not shoot
them further isolating Mubarak. Mubarak has tried to have the internet connection
shut off, thinking it would disrupt their organization but he failed because by then the
activists used other methods to organize and gained the sympathy of a large portion of
the country who had similar concerns, resulting in 18 days of protests and sit in that
brought the country to a standstill. The protests started with a certain segment of
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society, the Muslim Brotherhood did not participate in the initial days in fear that the
movement would fail and anger the regime against them in addition to the
government security department had threatened to place the Supreme Guide,
Mohammed Badie, under arrest if any of the Brothers joined in the protests (Trager
114), something they would be heavily criticized for when they would later
participate and try to take credit. After it became clear that this was not simply a
movement, but a revolution they used their extensive grassroots support as well as
organizational abilities to gain the movement even more supporters. However, on the
second day of the demonstrations, the Guidance Office felt compelled to give in to the
requests of its younger members to take part in the protests. This showed again the
generational gap that existed within the group because the youth felt that this
movement for democracy is essential, but the older generations were more
conservative. The Muslim Brotherhood thus, made participation obligatory for the
planned January 28 demonstration, which was also referred to as “Friday of Rage”
(Trager 114). Using the hierarchical communication system, the Brothers were able to
join en masse in the protest, despite the absence of online communication. They used
telephones instead to reach people and those who were against the oppressions that
the Mubarak government was doing sought support not only from political
oppositionist, but also from everyone else. After a week Mubarak appeared on
national television announcing that he had asked the government to submit its
resignation but he will stay in power (Parks para 8) a compromise seen as too little
too late and the civil unrest peaked and the ceiling of demands increased and Mubarak
tried to remain defiant by refusing to resign; demonstrators rebelled against curfews.
The protesters then came to demand that the president himself resign, but despite
increasing anger he expressed that he intended to stay in power giving further

Al Khalifa 67
concessions believing that such concessions were enough to pacify the people.
Finally, on February 11, Mubarak resigned and handed power to the Supreme
Council of Egypt’s armed forces. It was seen as a victory for democracy movements
around the world and emboldened even more Middle Eastern countries into following
suit, however; as proven later, the road towards real democratic change was not going
to be an easy trail for the Egyptians. The damage done to Egyptian society has been
systemic and there are no easy antidotes for such deep-seated social ills. Bits and
pieces of the old regime were still there, the Interior Ministry had the same people and
the security apparatus which can be considered a victim of the regime still used the
same brutal tactics that caused people to revolt in the first place, and most other
Mubarak henchmen were still in secured positions. The country was now under
military rule and the promised six months of interim rule was already looking very
difficult. One of the largest problems left by the Mubarak regime was the difficult task
of achieving social justice and closing the gap between the rich and the poor. By the
time Mubarak resigned from the presidency, he was estimated to have a net worth of
$5 billion (Baram para 5). Most of this fortune is saved up in offshore accounts, and
invested in prime real estate. The Mubarak family accumulated its wealth through
partnerships with foreign firms that invested in Egypt, wherein foreign investment
was welcome except that a local partner (or sponsor) had to have a 51% stake in the
investment (Baram para 11). Mubarak’s close circle and immediate family members
were typically the sponsors or partners, while millions of Egyptians starved and
wallowed in unemployment. By the time he stepped down, 50% of Egyptian men did
not have jobs and 90% of women stayed jobless (Baram para 14). Mubarak and his
henchmen's control of many of the state’s resources showed how levels of corruption
were very high resulting in mismanagement of resources and abuse of power
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depleting the economy’s sources.

4.2: An Overview of the 2011 Revolution through Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of
Revolution
Crane Brinton provides as different theory into further understanding how
revolutions affect societies. The Egyptian Revolution may be understood better
through the work of Crane Brinton that compared the British, American, French and
Russian revolutions. Written in 1938, the book has been very influential with scholars
with the theory holding true to date. In Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution, a
revolution is defined to be a “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of
the running of a territorial political entity by another . . .” (Brinton, 4). It is compared
to a disease with an accompanying high fever, a condition in which the body tries to
re-establish the original condition; so it is with societies in which attempts are made
to restore things back to its original state prior to the revolution, the main reason why
revolutions are unable to achieve many revolutionary goals. It differs from a disease
as symptoms may have been present for generations. Frequently, revolutions begin
with moderation (Rule of the Moderates) and become a crisis in which the most
violent revolutionaries dominate (Reign of Terror) (Brinton, 17). The crisis is
followed by convalescence in which the society can be immunized from the same
attacks, they are stronger, but in no way entirely remade. Brinton claims that the
revolutions of the English, French and Russian had similar trajectories, fighting their
ruling classes; the Americans fought against British policies.
The author forwards that ideas form part of equally dependent variables that
result to revolutions, “no ideas, and no revolution” (Brinton, 49). Brinton talks about
class divisions and antagonisms and of a government who continually tries to milk its
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reluctant citizenry. He also forwards that a revolution only becomes a revolution when
the armed forces have been won over (Brinton, 89). He then discusses the roles of
moderates and extremist, the moderates first take control followed by the radicals, a
strongman takes charge and things go back to moderation. Enthusiasm for religion,
ritual, organization and ideas appear tied up with “economic and political aims, with a
program to change things, institutions, laws, not just to convert people” (Brinton,
186). Some abuses committed in the old regime as well as certain institutions are
removed, but others are slightly changed; government machineries work better after
the revolution (Brinton, 239). Such revolutions leave a successful revolt tradition and
are followed in other parts of the world.

4.3: The Muslim Brotherhood and Elections
Before the resignation of Mubarak, the political scene in Egypt was severely
damaged. Mubarak used his state apparatus to intimidate political opposition and the
state of emergency to prevent the legal development of political parties made
opposition weak in Egypt. After the fall of the Mubarak regime the political actors in
Egypt achieved the right to be able to form legal parties. The Muslim Brotherhood
was given the opportunity to create their own party for the first time since their
creation. This step in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood marks great significance
in the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. The initial philosophy of Hassan al
Banna was against the party politics that existed during the time of its creation,
because it caused disunity in Egyptian society. This mentality existed within the group
and those older generations opposed the creation of a party. This internal conflict
shows the diversity of mentalities within the Muslim Brotherhood and how that does
affect the pragmatic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood.
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After the fall of Mubarak a review of the political parties law was made which
symbolized the beginnings of an actual democratic multiparty system, an essential
characteristic of a democracy. The review of the party law included a main stipulation
in which a party’s “principles, platforms, methods of operation and choice of
leaderships and members a party may neither be based on religion, class, sect,
profession or geography, nor be established on account of gender, language, religion
or creed” (Lehmann) yet despite that the Muslim Brotherhood submitted its papers in
which it stated that it is in fact a “civil” party which allowed for the application to be
accepted. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party. The
creation of the Freedom and Justice Party caused fear amongst other parties because it
brought back memories of previous elections where the Muslim Brotherhood was able
to gain enough support to win a significant number of seats in the parliament even
with the legal obstacles placed by the regime, and with the political scene in Egypt
still not fully developed other parties feared that they would not be properly
represented in the new parliament, a fear that would in fact turn out to be substantial
as the next year to come would “soon gave way to an Islamist tsunami that prevailed
at every electoral contest held in the past two and a half years” (Tadros 2013).
With the upcoming elections it became evident that the generational gap was
leaning in favour of those who supported running for elections as opposed to those
who wanted to stay with the old traditions and notions of al-Banna. These younger
generations as Lorenzo Vidino points out have “complained about the rigid hierarchy
of the organization and their exclusion from its upper elections” (Vidino, 6). The 2011
Revolution caused an internal split where these younger generations participated
despite the leadership not doing so. Like previous phases in history, the Muslim
Brotherhood also had to adapt to this new phase through new tactics and reform. The
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most significant development is the ideological changes that the group went through
in order to adapt to the new phase of politics. In this instance the Brotherhood was
faced with the reality of adopting its ideology into a platform which there was a
significant chance that they would have the opportunity to implement it. In 2004, the
Brotherhood drafted the Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood on Principles of Reform
in Egypt. This document encompasses generalized statement of goals envisioned for
Egyptian society by the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2005, the Electoral Program of the
Muslim Brotherhood, was issued in anticipation of the in the lower parliamentary
house, and in 2007, a similar document was issued prior to the elections of the upper
parliamentary house (Stilt, 84). Most significant of all these documents is the 2007
Draft Platform of the Political Party, which is referred to simply as the “Platform”
(Stilt, 84). The platform can be seen as a compromise as well because it includes
aspects of human rights to help gain the trust of the younger members, while at the
same time it includes Islamic components are as an attempt to appeal to core and
long-time supporters. The Brotherhood, in its documents, makes it clear that it has no
intention of imposing a theocracy and it also recognize Egypt to be a civil state. They
make this opinion a core of their 2011 Platform in which they state that:
“The State is civil and civilian, for the Islamic State is civilian in nature. It is not
a military state ruled by armed forces who get in power by military coups, and it
is not ruled like a dictatorship, nor is it a police state controlled by the security
forces, nor is it a theocracy -governed by the clergy or by Divine Right. There
are no infallible people who can monopolise the interpretation of the Holy
Koran and have exclusive right to legislation for the nation and are
characterised by Holiness.” (Freedom and Justice)
It is just clear that the group sees a larger role for religion in politics and seeks
to reform the system to reform state institutions to accept such an ideology. Before the
2007 Platform, the Brotherhood was careful not to dwell on the role that Islamic law
should play in state politics. The Platform, which is much lengthier and is more
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detailed, finally explains party positions if they were given the chance to legitimately
participate in Egyptian politics. It pledges support to the Egyptian constitution and has
no plans of replacing it (Stilt, 87). This is a development from previous documents
that showed some members having disagreements with the constitution and would
like it replaced.
This change in ideology has long been coming but in the face of elections the
Muslim Brotherhood formulated a new platform in order to face this new phase of
Egyptian politics where they would have to reconcile their previous ideology in order
to formulate a new one. Issues such as the role of religion in politics, the role of
women and Copts as well as the question of democracy would have to be clearly
addressed. The earlier 2005 electoral program addresses several of these ideological
developments that the Muslim Brotherhood reached; it stipulates that a religious
political power is not a tenet of the religion of Islam. The state as conceived in Islam
takes the form of a civil state where the system is determined by the community in
which Islamic law defines the framework of fixed norms. The same type of rhetoric
appear in the 2007 Platform; however, given that the Brotherhood itself has internal
divisions, the conservative stance adopted points to the dominance of the conservative
in writing the final draft. When it was published and was spread through the internet;
it drew criticism and the Brotherhood promised to revise it. The Platform starts on the
purposes (maqasid) with very general statements; this concerns the Islamic Sharia,
“stated as the protection of religion, life, honor, reason, and property form the
Brotherhood’s guiding policies in determining its goals, strategies, and policies”
(Stilt, 91). The language can be compared to the platform which was released in 2011,
where it was filled with notions of aspects such as human rights and equal citizenship.
This terminology reflects the younger generations how were from the student
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movement during Sadat’s era and the youth under Mubarak’s era, who were less of
hardliners and were more concerned with issues such as human rights. The rhetoric is
seen as a form of assurance to the world that the Muslim Brotherhood is ready to
engage in democracy.
The FJP would be a reflection of the main ideology of the Muslim
Brotherhood on issues such as the application of Shariah in the state in which the new
platform explains that “the State envisaged in our program is the national
constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based on Sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of
reference. By its nature, Sharia nurtures aspects of faith, worship and morality, and
also regulates various aspects of life for Muslims and their non-Muslim partners in the
homeland” (Freedom and Justice Party). This is an example of how ideology is
evolved, although this can be criticized by the notion of how the application of
Shariah should be. The issue of Shariah is very important to the Muslim
Brotherhood’s goals because it represents how they intend to reinstitute religion in the
lives of people.
Anther ideological issue that the Muslim Brotherhood would face is its stance
on issues such as democracy. During the beginning of the revolution optimists viewed
the Muslim Brotherhood as a “religiously conservative yet democratic leaning
movement that has undergone significant changes throughout history and has reached
maturity” (Vidino, 8). This maturity can be seen as the lessons learned from previous
experiences which were discussed previously in this study. The organization, has
reached the point where it “fully rejects violence and engages in democratic
processes” (Vidino, 8). Although pessimists would view that the group simply
adopted these methods as an elaborate tactic as a means to an end, which is coming to
power in order to have the change that they seek. In the post 2011 Egypt the Muslim

Al Khalifa 74
Brotherhood has renounced violence in fact and has participated in all the methods of
democracy in order to gain as many seats as possible. But even though their original
motto was “participation not domination” critics would argue that while they may not
have gone after the exact majority they have in fact ensured that their voice would be
the most dominant one in institutions such as the Shura Council and the People’s
Assembly.
The Muslim Brotherhood has always kept a motto when it came to politics
which is “participation not domination”. This motto indicates that they are aware of
the support that they have in society and their ability to harness this support towards
elections. When elections and campaigning started a segment of society were still
afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood and this can largely be credited to the image that
the previous regime had used to describe. They were commonly referred to as
terrorists and more often than not the regime would use this image to scare voters to
voting for the regime. Many scholars would point out all evidence points out that the
Muslim Brotherhood was “changing, or indeed had changed, into a modern political
movement” (Abrams). He also explains that the environment the group was
participating in would once again force it to moderate through “it’s very participation
in the democratic process would moderate it or, in the worst circumstances, it would
be forced to moderate due to the burdens of governance and a failing economy”
(Abrams). There are many reasons that can explain the reason that they take this
gradual position when it comes to political participation. One of those reasons is that
they want to maintain the image of a party which participates with other emerging
parties. On some level it could also be deduced that the Freedom and Justice Party
wanted to distance themselves from the mistakes that were previously made by
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party which sought to dominate every election. Other
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explanations of scholars such as Nathan Brown explain that this is descriptive of the
state in which Egypt was in. The “hazy and unsettled rules” (Brown) make it difficult
for one actor to completely be in control of the scene. During its initial campaigning
for Egypt’s scholar Nathan Brown comments saying that it “plunged into politics with
unprecedented enthusiasm, focusing all of its energies and impressive organizational
heft on the parliamentary vote” (Brown). In its initial campaigning the group would
explain that it is in fact not seeking a majority but is seeking one-third of the
parliamentary seats. In response to fears that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party would win a majority of the seats opposition leaders would respond
saying that they do not comprise the majority of the Egyptian population and that
notion would not be likely. Yet despite these assertions the FJP was able to win 235
seats or what translates to 47.2% of the seats in parliament, when combined with the
conservative Salafi party the Al-Nour Party who won 121 seats or 24.3%, the political
Islam ideology was able to win the clear majority of seats in the new parliament.
These results while they came surprising to members of the opposition should not be
entirely surprising. In order to understand the results of the FJP it is important to study
the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the build-up to the elections and the
environment they were competing in.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party would claim more than
the seats it had said it would run for which created fears for the liberal opposition who
saw this as a sign of the beginning of the Brotherhood controlling the political scene
in Egypt and effectively excluding them. Unlike other political groups in Egypt the
Muslim Brotherhood has been functioning for decades in which it focused on welfare
to cover the needs which were ignored by the state. The Muslim Brotherhood could
have won much more seats but it chose to not do so, which is an indication of them
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looking towards cementing their role the future of Egyptian politics. This can be
perceived in several ways, the first being that the Muslim Brotherhood despite
claiming it would run for only one third of the seats, it ran for and won for under half
of the seats in parliament. This can be compared to the days of the Mubarak regime
where the members of the NDP would essentially run and dominate the parliament.
The first parliamentary elections after the revolution would be very important to the
Muslim Brotherhood in order to finally be able to achieve their political goals that
they have been working towards for decades. Doing well in the first parliamentary
elections would enable the Brotherhood powers such as the ability to select the new
speaker of the parliament, but arguably the most important repercussion of doing well
in the parliamentary elections is controlling a large stake in the selection of the people
on the committee which drafts the constitution. In understanding why the Muslim
Brotherhood did so well in these elections one must only look towards the decades of
work which the organization has been building. The first reason to explain why the
Freedom of Justice Party achieved so many seats in the elections is because it was
associated with all the charity work which the organization controls. In the mind of
the average Egypt these short term social services are seen as tangible change that is
credited to the organization and voters would vote in hopes of these being applied on
the state as a whole. The Muslim Brotherhood “runs numerous institutions, including
hospitals, schools, banks, businesses, foundations, day care centres, thrift shops,
social clubs, and facilities for the disabled” (Laub). These projects which the Muslim
Brotherhood used to help the people would instil a sense of loyalty in the people
causing them to vote for the FJP. The implications of these charity services also
contribute to reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood did so well in the elections. The
financials it takes to run such wide scale services shows how well funded the Muslim
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Brotherhood is and its ability to fund the campaigns of its members that it chose to
field. This level of organization, be it through loyalty of members in society who have
benefited from the Muslim Brotherhood or their extensive funds, is much more
advanced than that of the opposition, automatically placing them in the forefront of
elections.
Another reason explaining why the FJP did well in elections is the state of the
opposition at the time of elections. As mentioned earlier in the study, the Muslim
Brotherhood has been functioning for decades providing goods and services for the
people and with that they have slowly been introducing themselves as viable
opposition the more they are able to occupy the area which the state ignores by
ignoring the segment of society which has been long ignored. This speaks of the
power of the Muslim Brotherhood which is building connections which ultimately
translated to voter confidence. Carnegie scholar Thomas Carothers characterizes the
opposition as “Cairo-centric elites who cannot be bothered to devote time and energy
to build sustainable grassroots bases and party networks” (Carothers). This is the
strength of the Muslim Brotherhood which is its ability to go to the villages and get
the support of the people. Carothers comments that these liberal parties “waste too
much time and energy and squabbling with each other over petty issues for the sake of
meaningless political advantages rather than trying to solve the country’s problems in
a constructive, cooperative way” (Carothers). This is also reflective of a strength in
the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as a weakness. The strength of
this quality is that the Muslim Brotherhood and by extension the FJP has no need to
formulate any connections with other parties for the sake of gaining seats because it is
a very strong grassroots movement which can rely on its supporters in its time of
need. The weakness appears in the practice of politics, which is that no party can rely
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strictly on itself in order to govern it must form coalitions and negotiate with other
parties. The formation of these grassroots support also is a strength of the Muslim
Brotherhood who’s candidates are seen as accessible to the people and have been seen
by the voters before, thus establishing a connection, unlike the opposition who “only
become active during election time when they come looking for [a person’s] vote; the
rest of the time [they] are never hear[d] from” (Carothers).
An important argument made about the Muslim Brotherhood is that they have
been elected through free and fair elections, but this claim can ultimately refuted on
the grounds that while they were free where anyone can chose the candidate they
wanted, these elections though were not fair. The lack of fairness can be seen when
comparing the status of the opposition to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The charity
services of the Muslim Brotherhood can also be seen as a form of bribery because
people would be voting for the candidates on the grounds of bribes offered. Such
examples include a report by Leila Fadel explaining how:
“In a poor district of eastern Cairo on Friday, families crowded outside the
neighbourhood mosque as volunteers for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
party yelled out prices on discounted potatoes, lemons, green beans and other
vegetables. Sewage ran through potholed streets, and garbage was piled high. Many
families in the neighbourhood share one-room dwellings that serve as their kitchen,
bedroom and living room.” (Fadel)
The author explains that during an interview of a woman who bought some of the
cheaper produce “she will likely vote for the party” (Fadel). Through looking at this
argument it becomes apparent as one of the reasons which led for this parliament
ultimately was dissolved and the ultimate ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood from
power. The Muslim Brotherhood applied the same tactics when it came to the
presidential elections, relying on the support of its members and the dismal state of
the opposition, who could not unite their votes for a common candidate, to gain more
supporters. The Freedom and Justice Party fielded the president of its party Mohamed
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Morsi who won the first round of elections along with Ahmed Shafik a retired air
marshal as well as the last prime minister under President Hosni Mubarak. Mohamed
Morsi won the second round of elections becoming the first elected president of
Egypt. There are several reasons when understanding why people would vote for
him. Many of the people voted for Mohamed Morsi because he was the candidate of
the FJP, which once again mobilized to get people to vote for him. The Muslim
Brotherhood was able to once again translate its mass organizational skills to help its
own candidate who was the president of the FJP in order to help him win. The results
of the elections were a shock everywhere because the candidate of the Brotherhood
won by a small difference, 1%. This showed how the Muslim Brotherhood were
possibly starting to lose some of their support on the ground as the officials were
elected to office and their constituents were beginning to realize that the Brotherhood
were not living up to their promises. The presidential elections left revolutionaries
with a dilemma of voting between a candidate representing the old regime and a
candidate represented the Muslim Brotherhood which by the time presidential
elections had controlled a large portion of the People’s Assembly and controlled a
58% of the Shura council. This contradicted their original principle of “participation
not domination”. When breaking down the reasons behind voting for the candidate of
the Muslim Brotherhood it becomes apparent that many of the people voted for him in
order to avoid voting for the candidate of the old regime. This would challenge the
notion of free and fair elections which would ultimately question whether this was a
true democratic practice. The Supreme Constitutional Court would also rule that the
Shura Council be disbanded when the new parliament was elected, but this was
ultimately disrupted with the 30th of June Revolution.

When looking at the role of the Muslim Brotherhood during the transitional
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phase in the build-up to the 30th of June it becomes evident that while they tried to
maintain the image of a moderate democratic group they failed when it came to
practice which forced people to return to the streets to demand the fall of the Muslim
Brotherhood and its party from power. This would indicate that while the group may
have possibly been elected democratically elected, albeit through questionable means,
it still did not meet the promises that it made the people when Mohamed Morsi was
elected. In addition to not meeting the needs of the people, it also proved that it
employed measures that have been used by the previous regime to consolidate power
and to exclude the opposition.
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Chapter 5: The Muslim Brotherhood and the 30th of June Revolution
5.1: Failures of the Muslim Brotherhood and the road to June 30th Revolution
The 30th of June Revolution started through a petition by a group of youth who
saw that the state was being controlled not by President Morsi, who advocated in his
campaign that he would be a president to all Egyptians, but was being controlled by
the Muslim Brotherhood. This stance is reminiscent of the tactics that were used by
Mubarak’s regime in order to control the state. The Mubarak regime and the NDP was
the only group which was benefiting from the state while the rest of the population
was kept out of power. The situation under President Morsi was quite similar where
he isolated the youth along and even though he was democratically elected he was
making mistakes in state building which delegitimize his rule and eventually led to his
downfall in the 3rd of July 2013.
The first aspect which led to the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood would
be the exclusion of the other political players in the scene in Egypt. While the Muslim
Brotherhood first advocated that it would be moderate in terms of its aspirations to
power yet the opposition was shocked to see what Samuel Tadros explains as “the
Brotherhood abandon[ing] any perceived moderation and moved in a clearly
authoritarian direction” (Tadros, 2013). This was the beginning of the opposition
realizing that the democratically elected government was moving towards
consolidating its power to ensure that it stays in power. The first instance that the
Muslim Brotherhood was moving to consolidate its power is the assembly it selected
in order to formulate the constitution. The formation of the government was criticized
that the FJP excluded the opposition and instead further consolidated their power. The
Muslim Brotherhood would point out to statistics and say that they are not taking
over, but while they may have not taken the majority in terms of numbers they
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awarded themselves key ministerial positions (Wickham). President Morsi would also
award supporters key positions such as the governor’s position. In the last selection he
gave seven positions to members of the Muslim Brotherhood one to the Gama al
Islamiya and the rest to military men (Wickham). This tactic was also used by
Mubarak to further gain support through patronage. In this example the award is a
form of key positions.
The formulation of the constitutional assembly gave the first impression that
the Muslim Brotherhood was seeking more than a simply moderate role in the new
Egyptian politics. The first task after the 2011 Revolution was to create a new
constitution which would be aimed at representing Egyptians everywhere. The way
the constituent assembly was to be formed was through the parliament in which the
members of the parliament voted on the members which would make up the 100
person assembly (Wickham). This immediately sparked fears in the opposition for the
representation of minorities and women. And these fears were actually substantial.
Upon the election of the constituent assembly the one factor that became very obvious
of the committee of 100 is the 66 Islamist thinkers which were included in them. This
automatically gave the Islamists who had banded together on common grounds such
as the role of religion in politics an advantage. The Islamists were given the majority
and the final 34 seats to all of the Copts and liberal parties. The women which were
given seats were Islamists; this was a way the Freedom and Justice Party could take
over more seats. This goes against the Muslim Brotherhood’s comments about how
they intent to be inclusive. It can be seen as an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood’s
FJP who control a large portion of the parliament to control the long term future of the
country. The constitution which is meant to set the building blocks of the structure of
the state is very important for the future of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood by having
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a majority of the seats in the constituent assembly would be able to have a larger stake
in the structure of the state which would further empower them. This tactic violates
the notions of democracy and inclusion and is very reminiscent of the control the
NDP had over decisions regarding the state. This assembly was ultimately disbanded
by the Supreme Constitutional Court which was considered a success for the liberals,
women and minorities.
The parliament was now faced with the task of formulating a second
constituent assembly to form the constitution. The legislative assembly of the
parliament issues the constituent assembly law which stipulates that the assembly
would be comprised of 100 people, but unlike the previous assembly only 39
members would be from the parliament. While this was considered a new change and
the possibility for reform was considered possible. But as the assembly proceeded
with writing the constitutions people began withdrawing from the assembly on the
grounds that the still Islamist dominated assembly was excluding the opposition. By
the time it had completed drafting the constitution the assembly “there was not a
single Christian and only four women, all Islamists. Many of the men wore beards,
the hallmark of Muslim conservatives” (Hendawi). The assembly which was
dominated by Islamists by the end of its sessions still proceeded with the drafting of
the constitution and finished voting on it 16 hours (Hussein). The constitution when
put up for referendum for the people with “ with about a 30% turnout in which it
garnered only 63%– i.e. only a fifth of the country voted for it” (Hendawi). Due to the
judges being on strike there was no monitoring for this process which ultimately
meant that this election did not meet international regulation (Hendawi). The fact that
this constitution was made with little consensus and lack of participation
delegitimizes the whole process which does not reflect how a democracy should
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function. In an article in the Guardian, Elijah Zarwan, a Cairo-based fellow at the
European Council for Foreign Relations comments on the constitution saying that:
"the Muslim Brotherhood can succeed in passing this constitution despite the
opposition but in so doing they are likely to poison the country's political
atmosphere for years to come and my assumption is that the constitution, if
passed, will not survive beyond Brotherhood rule," (Hussein).
This process of drafting the constitution reflects on two different segments of
the political scene in Egypt. The first of which being the Muslim Brotherhood who
had a large say in the formation of this new constitution and effectively drove the
opposition out of the decision making process despite “its promises of being an
inclusive organization, [observers] had expected the Brotherhood to reach out to its
opponents and attempt to build a national consensus to sail the turbulent waters into
which Egypt was heading” (Tadros 2013). The second segment that this reflects on is
opposition who are still weak in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood and their political
wing the Freedom and Justice Party. This internal conflict has in effect resulted in the
poor application of democracy. The elected majority did not enforce it by seeking
negotiations with the opposition, instead isolating the opposition and seeking the
authoritarian method by enforcing their own way. This relationship between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition helps show that a democratically elected
group with does not necessarily result with a democratic process. The resulting
constitution further showed how the Muslim Brotherhood was not inclusive in the
drafting of this constitution. Upon looking through the constitution it becomes evident
that there were many articles which had implications of an authoritarian state. Article
10 stipulates that “The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian
family, its cohesion and stability, and to protect its moral values, all as regulated by
law” (Controversial Articles). The implications of this article extend to endangering
the personal freedom of the individual in the name of “protecting moral values.” This
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part of the article grants the state the ability to judge the moral values of the
individual as well as do what is necessary as deemed by the state in order to safeguard
said moral values. Another article which can have the consequence of an authoritarian
regime is article 4 which states that:
“Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive
autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and
the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be
consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law” (Controversial articles).
Many had criticized this article because it gave al-Azhar unprecedented control over
the interpretation of Shariah and this created fears that this article may “lead to
complications in the future, due to fears that future leadership may use the new
authority to mandate repressive laws” (Controversial articles).
In the weeks after the election of Mohamed Morsi he was always referred to
as the first democratically elected president, a point which is contested previously in
this study. Weeks after his election President Morsi issued a constitutional declaration
which was considered disastrous and was considered a breach of democracy. The
declaration was released in light of there being a threat that the second constitute
assembly being disbanded. This declaration included seven articles. The second
article stipulated that:
“Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president
since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a
new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and
binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be
suspended or cancelled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any
judicial body against these decisions are annulled” (English text).
The second article of the constitutional declaration can only be described as
authoritarian because it places the president and his decisions before those of the
judiciary and makes all of his decisions immune. This gives the president
unprecedented powers, a notion that is not accepted by a democracy. The second

Al Khalifa 86
article of the constitutional declaration was met with great outrage by activists
because it gave the president unlimited power without the judicial body to place a
limit on these powers. Amr Hamzawy commented saying that “Egypt is facing a
horrifying coup against legitimacy and the rule of law and a complete assassination of
the democratic transition” (Kirkpatric). This article represents the value of the rule of
law to the regime. Through this declaration President Morsi has placed himself above
the law. Another article that also increased the power of the president is article 5
which stipulates that “No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house
of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly” (English text). This article can be seen in
light of the disbanding of the previous constituent assembly. With the Muslim
Brotherhood wanting to increase its power and essentially lay the building blocks for
the future to ensure that its power becomes uninterrupted by judicial power an article
such as article 5 would essentially give it free reign to act within the constituent
assembly without caring that there would be judicial repercussions or the threat of
disbanding the assembly. This article also represents the president increasing his
power and consolidating it on behalf of the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Article three can also be interpreted by as a way to further consolidate power
and shows how the state was moving back towards an authoritarian system. Article 3
of the declaration states that:
“The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the
judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years
commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of
being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This
provision applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate
effect.” (English text).
This article of the declaration can be interpreted as a method by the Freedom and
Justice Party to place someone it can trust in a position which supposed to be neutral.
This caused further problems with the judiciary which had already protested that
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Morsi was consolidating power and was rising over the judiciary. The most important
article in the constitutional declaration is Article 6. Article 6 in the constitutional
declaration stipulates that “The President may take the necessary actions and
measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution” (English text). This
grants the president to do whatever is necessary in the name of safeguarding the
“goals of the revolution”. Open ended terms such as these are commonly used by
authoritarian rulers in order to be able to act in whatever fashion they want without
any legal provisions which would ultimately tip the balance of the Muslim
Brotherhood controlled president. This article is similar to a tactic which was used by
previous regimes which is the state of emergency. The state of emergency allowed
Mubarak to control the state in the name of national security and allowed him to do
whatever is necessary to maintain “national security”. In this example President Morsi
has granted himself power to do whatever is necessary to “protect the goals of the
revolution.” Scholar Nathan Brown explains this constitutional declaration when he
comments on the message being “I, Morsi, am all powerful. And in my first act as
being all powerful, I declare myself more powerful still. But don’t worry — it’s just
for a little while” (Kirkpatrick). The differences between the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice Party tactics and the National Democratic Party are not
completely different. Both have sought to consolidate their power using legal means
in the same of safeguarding the state. President Morsi would also come in direct clash
with the Supreme Constitutional Court when he would call upon the already
disbanded People’s Assembly. This was seen by activists as an act to bring back the
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist dominated parliament to aid the president in
passing laws quicker. This action to bring back the parliament in addition to the
constitutional declaration put Morsi in conflict with the judiciary and eventually
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causing them to hold strikes in protests to his actions. When he assumed power
President Morsi also changed the age of retirement of judges from 70 to 60 years of
age, this would have effectively caused a fourth of the judges to go on retirement,
allowing Morsi to place more Muslim Brotherhood members in the judiciary to
ensure that he would have more support (Hussein). This unlimited access and seeking
of control on behalf of President Morsi shows that even though leaders or groups can
be democratically elected it does not necessarily equate with a democracy because
democracy is a process not simply elections only.

5.2: Nahda Project
The shortcomings of the Muslim Brotherhood in state building extends past
simply constitutions and laws in order to further consolidate their power it is also seen
in the promises that the Muslim Brotherhood gave. With the election of the Freedom
and Justice Party the Muslim Brotherhood were finally given the opportunity to apply
their solution to what they saw is wrong with society and what they have been
planning for the past 80 years since its creation and it would be held accountable for
these promises. Khairat El Shater describes this program as “‘the result of a
tremendous effort and hard work that lasted well over fifteen years’ and that it was
supported by the ‘talents and experience of more than 80 years.’ If implemented, the
project would uplift Egypt in four years” (Tadros 2013). After a revolution which
caused people to have high expectations the burden fell on the shoulders of the
Muslim Brotherhood to make these promises happen. The Muslim Brotherhood
advocated for their Nahda Project. According to El-Shater, it:
“started with building a democratic system and strong political
institutions,… women had a role in it, the Freedom and Justice Party’s Women
Committee added; it ‘aimed primarily at the elimination of poverty and
unemployment,’ Ali Fateh al Bab declared; and there was even a ‘Nahda-based
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education campaign,’ a press conference announced. Sinai was the priority of
the Nahda project, Presidential candidate Morsi promised; one week later it was
tourism that was the declared priority of the project; finally the project was
‘based on empowering the people and placing their destinies in their own
hands.’ (Tadros 2013)
This Nahda project seemed the accumulation of years of political experience as well
as ideological reform, but upon inspection of the Nahda Project it becomes obvious
that it was meant as rhetoric as opposed to being made up of actual substance and
when it came time for the President Morsi to apply the Nahda Project people did not
feel any tangible effects on the ground (Tadros, 2013). When it came time to discuss
the ways to solve problems such as social justice or education reform, the members of
the parliament discussed issues such as personal status laws this caused people to turn
greatly against the Muslim Brotherhood.
5.3: 30th of June Revolution
By the end of the first year under the rule of Mohamed Morsi and what the
people felt was an increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, a grassroots
movement started called Tamarod. This movement would successfully organize the
protests of the 30th of June which would cause the military to intervene and oust
Morsi. The unpopularity of the performance of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood can be seen in a poll taken by Gallup it is evident that the Freedom and
Justice Party had lost large portion of its support.
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Source: Gallup
In this graph it becomes clear that the performance of the Freedom and Justice
Party has been steadily declining. The steady decline of supporters is what caused the
success of the 30th of June Revolution. What the two years under the influence of the
Muslim Brotherhood ruling accomplished is costing it a lot of its support from within
its own group. The Muslim Brotherhood as a result was discredited and their plan had
failed. The Muslim Brotherhood had no experience in governing and had in fact
become very increasingly similar to Mubarak’s NDP. The problem with the Muslim
Brotherhood can be seen as the lack of experience that while they did in fact run for
parliament and control syndicates this is hardly similar to governing a country the size
of Egypt. What made matters even more difficult is that their over ambition led them
to take on more responsibilities than they can handle and eventually fail because of
their inability to meet the high expectations of the people which they untimely placed
with their rhetoric. Their role as the strongest and most organized opposition became
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a detriment because there were no organizations, save the remnants of the old regime,
to match their ambition and ability which made them the only viable option for
governing in a scene where there were no political opposition to in effect cause them
to evolve in order to be elected again.
During the political crisis leading up to the events which occurred on the 30th
of June it became apparent that the ultimatum that the military issued to all the
political parties to resolve the crisis would not be met. President Morsi like Mubarak
before him appeared on national television and remained defiant which is an
indication that he may have not been aware of the magnitude of opposition to his rule.
The actions of the presidency and the FJP during the build-up to the revolution shows
several weaknesses on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood such as their inability to
negotiate and compromise with members of the opposition a skill that is essential in
the creation of a democracy. This is a weakness that comes from the internal
characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood. The strength of their structure and the
importance of loyalty within the group make it difficult for members to trust outside
their group. This made the FJP unable to reach a common ground with the opposition
in order to possibly avoid this. This lack of trust existed on both ends of the crisis;
both groups the Muslim Brotherhood and their opposition could no longer trust each
other or their word. On the part of the opposition this comes from the multitude of
promises that the FJP made to be inclusive only to ignore the opposition and take
action on their own. After the events of the 30th of June the Freedom and Justice Party
remained defiant and challenged the military’s ouster of the president. When asked
about the events members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party
are quick to blame the military and the opposition and claim that they have legitimacy
because of the ballot box. While the ballot box is important in developing a
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democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood was in fact placing regulations that would have
brought back an authoritarian system. When questioned about their own actions, they
are:
“wilfully ignoring the fact that a moment of widespread and popular outrage did
occur on June 30—not to mention the posing of legitimate questions regarding certain
government departments and economic and financial matters—as a result of their
disastrous mistakes in managing public and political affairs throughout Morsi’s year
in power.” (Hamzawy)
The Muslim Brotherhood has been staging marches and demonstrations which
while they claim are peaceful usually end in deadly clashes between citizens and the
Muslim Brotherhood. This is an indicator that the Muslim Brotherhood is not facing
opposition from the security forces, but is in fact being faced by the rising opposition
from people. The issue of violence is important because it is untimely causing the
Muslim Brotherhood to lose support on the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood’s
rhetoric has been violent and hate filled as explained by Amr Hamzawy as speeches
given in a “highly aggressive manner, they accuse of treason anyone who opposes, on
the basis of democracy, the intervention of the army in politics or anyone who refuses
to be silent about human rights violations” (Hamzawy). What this speech is creating
is further polarization of the state because it creates a “we they” mentality in the
streets of Egypt and the speeches are aimed at portraying everyone against the
Muslim Brotherhood are traitors of the country. The Freedom and Justice Party
refuses to acknowledge that they should find a common ground with the new regime.
The actions of the Freedom and Justice Party show that elections do not necessarily
indicate democracy. Achieving a democracy is contingent on many factors such as
ensuring that the ruler does not consolidate power and maintaining good relations
with the opposition in order to further the democratic process, all these factors were
not adopted by the Freedom and Justice Party.
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5.4: Muslim Brotherhood and the future
There are a lot of questions regarding the fact of the Muslim Brotherhood and
the political scene in Egypt. Since the ouster and subsequent sit in Rab’a El Adaweya
Square it has become evident that the Muslim Brotherhood is undergoing a period of
change with members from within the group deciding to accept the 30th of June reality
and start working again. These groups acknowledge many of the problems with the
Muslim Brotherhood come from a result of the older generations being the ones who
are in control of all the decisions and with the structure of loyalty within the group it
is very difficult to break off. The youth within the organization though are undergoing
this change and have in fact broken off from the larger group. The group,
“Brotherhood without Violence” defines “themselves as reformist, calling for the
withdrawal of confidence from the Supreme Guide Mohammad Badie and electing
new Guidance Bureau members, according to the movement’s coordinator Ahmad
Yahya.” (Sharaf). This group was created by the youth which further shows how the
generational divide within the group can lead to reformations which despite the
increasing opposition to the group’s violence and hate filled speech some may be able
to salvage the ideology in the fact of the public opinion.
Conclusion
The Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the rise of the 2011 Revolution and
was seen as the most organized opposition group on the political scene and this was
translated in the electoral votes seen in the parliamentary elections and once again
when the president of its political wing Dr. Mohamed Morsi won the elections. When
looking at the Muslim Brotherhood in its role in the 2011 Revolution it is important to
understand its evolution. The Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 by school
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teacher Hassan al-Banna who saw that the moral problems in the Egyptian society
needed to be resolved through strict application of Islam. He saw that amongst the
reasons behind these moral problems was British colonialism. Al-Banna started by
preaching to people about ways to become a better Muslim and through social
outreach programs he was able to create a highly intricate group with hundreds of
thousands of supporters and an increasing number of sympathizers. The ideology of
the group was very simple and appealed to a wide mass of people especially those
who were disenfranchised by the government. The slogan Islam is the answer was
very popular and was relatable to many and offered the promises of a social welfare
state. The strong structure of the group enabled them to maintain close ties and was
able to have them mobilize for protests in favour of the application of Shariah. AlBanna initially advocated for gradual reform but many began to get impatient. The
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics starts under the colonial era where
they would protest for Shariah. The colonial era was also a dark period for the
Muslim Brotherhood as they formed the Secret Apparatus. This apparatus would put
the group against the state and eventually lead to the assassination of Prime Minister
Nahas. The group would be banned but would still participate in politics through
demonstrations. This era would gain the Muslim Brotherhood many sympathizers and
more followers. The Muslim Brotherhood would be very popular by the end of the era
and would become the image of opposition to colonial rule.
The Muslim Brotherhood would participate with the Free Officers in the 1952
Revolution through gaining Nasser the support they needed in through their ability to
mobilize their supporters. After Nasser assumed power the relationship between the
regime and the Muslim Brotherhood would be good until an attempted assassination
would give Nasser the reason needed to take the Muslim Brotherhood out of the
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scene. He would imprison many of their members and cause many to flee which
created the global Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood would suffer
greatly under the rule of Nasser and would continue to try to protest against him, but
he eventually, due to his charismatic nature would win the popular support he needed
to stay in power.
During the reign of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood are released from jail as a
tactic by Sadat to counter act the socialists. Under the regain of Sadat and with Omar
al-Tilmisani as the General Guide the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to reclaim
some of its former glory and would renounce violence. While the group was tolerated
but was still not allowed to apply for a party and would still be subject of crackdowns
by the regime. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood still adapting the gradual
transformation tactic and would accept to run in some elections for the parliament
some would follow the more radical ideology of Sayid Qutb and break off and
eventually assassinate Sadat.
The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Mubarak would contribute greatly
to the development of the Muslim Brotherhood and shape them as the political entity
which would take the lead in the 2011 Revolution. In these three decades the Muslim
Brotherhood would be functioning under the state of emergency and would still be
successful and thrive. The Muslim Brotherhood would begin to gradually take over
the political scene through the use of the syndicate elections to gradually participate in
politics. This would be the beginning of seeing the Muslim Brotherhood engaging in a
democratic process. They would also compete in parliamentary elections and would
win seats as independents, but the regime would untimely be threatened by their
popularity and further impose legal obstacles to prevent them from gaining more
power. All these eras helped develop the Muslim Brotherhood into the entity that
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participated in the 2011 Revolution. Through these eras they gain experiences such as
how to make alliances in order to gain seats with through party lists. The group would
also gain the image of the opposition while gaining the experience and the grassroots
support that would turn it into the most organized opposition. The most important
development the group would undergo was the ideological transformations. With the
constant evolution of the group it would adopt certain notions in its platforms such as
democracy and human rights which would gain it popularity during the authoritarian
era of Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood would also increase its popularity through
increasing its social outreach programs and eventually further threaten the state by
occupying the areas where the state ignored.
During the 2011 Revolution the Muslim Brotherhood conservatives would
first be hesitant to participate fearing repercussions from the regime should the
uprisings fail. The youth would then eagerly participate and then when the movement
looked to be a success the rest of the Brotherhood’s supporters and members would
participate. After the fall of the Mubarak regime the country would undergo its first
free and fair elections. The Muslim Brotherhood would create its first political party
the Freedom and Justice Party and would compete in the parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood would use its Freedom and Justice Party in order to apply its goals in
society and eventually establish its version of a state. The Brotherhood would do very
well in elections and would win a 47% stake in the parliament and with the addition
of the Safali Al-Nour Party which shares some common grounds with the Muslim
Brotherhood the political Islam movement would dominate the parliament. The
secularists, liberals and revolutionaries would criticize the parliament as not
representative of Egypt. The supporters of the parliament would respond that this was
the result of free and fair elections. This study first contests that notion on the grounds
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that the elections while they may have been free, but they were not fair. The success
of the Islamists would be because of their financial backing as well as their ability to
mobilize and in combination with the weakness of the opposition the Islamists would
win the majority of the parliament. This study then goes on to argue that a
democratically elected government does not necessarily mean that it would be
employing the maintenance of a democracy or that it would be doing what is best for
the people.
This study argues this thesis through the use of the actions of the
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood, do not reflect that of a party which
intends to help further democracy in Egypt but instead intends to employ authoritarian
methods which were ironically employed by the NDP in order to repress and control
the Muslim Brotherhood. Such examples include the formation of a constitute
assembly which was made predominantly of Islamists and without the incorporation
of liberals, women or Copts. When the Supreme Constitutional Court would disband
the assembly they would create a new one and even with the first one failed they
would also create a predominantly Islamist assembly and most of the liberals, Copts
and women withdrew. This constitution would also include articles which would
threaten the basic rights and freedoms of the individual and would pass despite the
judges not overseeing the referendum and therefore not meet international regulations.
When the President of the Freedom and Justice Party, Mohamed Morsi was elected he
would advocate himself as the president of all Egyptians, yet despite that he would
make many decisions favouring his own party and supporters such as giving his party
and supporters key ministerial and governmental positions, a tactic which considered
patronage. Other examples include his presidential declaration which is seen as an
attempt to further consolidate his power in a very authoritarian way. All these
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examples help support this study’s argument that even though the Muslim
Brotherhood has had experience as the victim of oppression by authoritarian leaders
and even though its ideology claims to value participation not domination it still tried
to consolidate power and employed many of the same tactics to isolate the opposition
as the NDP. When the military moved to oust President Morsi after three days of
protests by millions of Egyptians, many would argue that this was a coup and the end
of democracy in Egypt, but upon looking at the practices of the Muslim Brotherhood
it becomes apparent that the group was laying the building blocks of an authoritarian
rule. The evidence helps show that democracy is more than a ballot box, it’s a
continuous process which the Muslim Brotherhood were stopping through highly
undemocratic tactics which shows that a democratically elected does not necessarily
mean the implementation of democracy.
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